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Executive Summary  
 
Until 20 years ago, Greece was considered largely a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and mono-religious 
country, a true ‘nation-state’ where the dominant nation, notably people of ethnic Greek descent and 
Christian Orthodox religion accounted for approx. 98% of the total population. The dominant 
definition of the nation was ethno-cultural and religious, while civic and territorial elements were of 
secondary importance in defining who is Greek. This view of the nation as a community of descent and 
culture was reflected in the Greek citizenship law which until recently was based almost exclusively on 
the jus sanguinis principle.  
The Greek state formally recognises only the existence of a religious Muslim minority in western 
Thrace that accounts for less than 0.2% of the total population of Greece. It also recognises 
numerically even smaller and relatively invisible religious minorities of Greek Jews, Catholics and 
Protestants. During the 1990s and following the dismantling of Yugoslavia, a Slavic speaking 
Macedonian minority has mobilised ethnically in northern Greece but its claims have been ignored 
(and to a certain extent suppressed) by the Greek state and the local Greek speaking majority. Part of 
Greece’s native minorities is also a relatively large Roma population (300-350,000 people) that is 
often subject to racist and discriminatory behaviours.  
During the last two decades Greece has become the host of more than a million returning co-ethnics, 
co-ethnic immigrants and foreigners – these groups accounting now for more than 10% of the total 
resident population. In particular Greece received in the late 1980s and during the 1990s approx. 
150,000 Pontic Greeks (co-ethnic returnees from the former Soviet Union) and nearly 240,000 ethnic 
Greek Albanians from southern Albania (the so-called Voreioipirotes). In addition during the 1990s 
and 2000s Greece has experienced significant inflows of economic migrants from eastern European, 
Asian and African countries. The total legal immigrant population is currently estimated at just under 
700,000, the largest groups being Albanians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Georgians, Ukrainians, 
Pakistani, and Bangladeshis.  
In order to understand better the kind of diversity challenges that the country has to deal with it is 
important to divide these groups into three categories: native minorities, co-ethnic migrants, and 
‘other’ migrants. 
With regard to native minority groups, the only oficially recognised minority of Greece is a religious 
one:  the Muslims of western Thrace (in the north-western border with Turkey), who are protected by 
the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In line with this treaty the Muslims of western Thrace enjoy a special set 
of cultural, religious and educational rights including the possibility to be judged under shari’a law, 
bilingual schools, and bilingualism in public administration. Comprising individuals of Turkish origin, 
Roma and Slav-speaking Pomaks, prior to World War II, the Muslims of Thrace coexisted largely as a 
religious community. Since the 1970s, the minority has mobilized to assert a common Turkish identity, 
thus stirring anxieties among Greek elites and the public opinion. Although an initially repressive 
state policy in the 1970s and 1980s has been replaced since 1991 with a series of measures ensuring 
the non-discrimination of minority members by the state and the full respect of their individual rights, 
the Greek state tenaciously refuses to recognise their existence as an ethnic (Turkish) community and 
is particularly sensitive to any assertions of collective ethnic rights on the part of the minority. 
Apart from the above officially recognised minority, there is a Slav-speaking population of 
northwestern Greece, widely known along Greece as Slav-Macedonians. These latter had mobilised 
politically in the 1990s, raising claims of cultural and linguistic recognition. During the last decade 
however the issue has largely disappeared from the public debate. In any case, the Greek state has so 
far refused to recognise officially this group as a minority and to satisfy any of the claims of the Slav-
speaking activists molilised.  
A native minority group that is worth special attention is the Roma population of Greece, i.e. the 
Roma that are not part of the Muslim minority of Thrace and thus are neither officially recognised nor 
protected in any specific way. The Roma live scattered throughout mainland Greece and make a living 
through metal and other garbage recycling, petty trade and farm work. Their phenotypical features 
  
and their particular life style (often nomadic and tent-dwelling, under age marriages, patriarchal 
extended families) set them apart from the majority population. Roma children are not welcome in 
mainstream schools and although segregated schooling is forbidden often local authorities and 
parent’s associations try to separate Roma children from their children at schools. Having dwelled in 
Greece for several centuries, the Roma challenge from within the dominant view of a Christian 
Orthodox Greek-speaking white and modern nation that Greeks have of themselves. 
Contrary to the native minorities, co-ethnic migrant populations are considered as integral part of the 
nation and are seen as relatively easy to integrate into the mainstream national culture. Co-ethnic 
migrants include Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek Albanians who have arrived in Greece largely in 
the 1990s as a result of the 1989 debacle of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. The former used to live in the Southern Republics of the former URSS (mainly along the Black 
Sea), while the latter were members of the recognised Greek minority in Southern Albania. Both the 
above groups do not pose any ethnic diversity challenges to the dominant Greek majority, since they 
are considered as co-ethnic or omogeneis in Greek (meaning of the same the same genos, i.e. of the 
same descent). Still, they certainly pose cultural and linguistic challenges even if overall they are well-
accepted by and in the Greek society mainly thanks to their Greek origin.  
‘Other’ immigrant populations in Greece include Albanians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians and 
Georgians, who actually form the oldest and largest immigrant groups in Greece and who challenge 
Greek society with their cultural or linguistic otherness but not really religiously as they are largely 
Christian (or non practicing Muslims). Romanians and Bulgarians technically are not considered 
migrants any longer as they have become EU citizens. Some of the more recently arrived groups, 
notably Pakistani and Bangladeshi citizens pose a great challenge to Greek society because of their 
different phenotype and Muslim religion even if numerically these communities are still relativley 
small. 
At the face of a 10% immigrant population Greece is slowly and to a certain extent reluctantly 
adapting its education and citizenship policies. A first step in this direction has been the reform of the 
citizenship law which took place only one year ago (in March 2010). This reform has provided for the 
nearly automatic naturalisation of children born in Greece of foreign parents provided their parents 
live legally in Greece. It has included provisions also for the naturalisation of children who have 
arrived in Greece at an early age and have attended for six years or more a Greek school. Last but not 
least the law has also facilitated the naturalisation of foreigners who live for 7 years or more in 
Greece. In education there have been efforts to train teachers in intercultural pedagogy and 
receptions classes are provided for non Greek speaking pupils but overall there is no concerted effort 
to accommodate cultural and religious diversity in school life. Difference is mainly seen as a 
‘problem’ of the foreign children. The ideal outcome is their assimilation into the rest of the school 
population. 
Indeed overall there is as yet no re-consideration of what it means to be Greek in the 21
st
 century. The 
still dominant definition of national identity does not embrace minority and immigrant groups, who 
are largely considered to be (and at a certain extend remain indeed) outside the Greek society. The 
recent citizenship law reform is actually seen with suspicion by many majority Greeks who disagree 
with the opening up of citizenship to people of non Greek descent.  
In the public and political discourses on minorities and immigrants, the tolerance of their cultural 
diversity is understood in Greece as liberal tolerance, meaning that one refrains from interfering with 
practices, individuals or groups that one does not approve of. Unlike the on-going discourses in 
Northern and Western Europe, concepts and norms such as liberalism or pluralism are not used in 
Greece. Besides, while multiculturality is gradually being accepted as a fact, multiculturalism is seen 
as a normative approach that predicates the co-existence of different communities. It is thus 
understood as a descriptive state of affairs signalling the parallel existence of several ethnic and 
cultural groups that are not integrated with one another into one whole. By contrast, Greek policy 
makers and scholars tend to favour intercultural dialogue meant as the integration of individuals – 
and certainly not communities – into Greek society. Interculturalism is thus understood as a normative 
  
approach that allows for individuals of different cultures to enter into mutually respectful dialogue. In 
the public debate, the intercultural approach is seen as favourable to societal cohesion. In practice, 
however, there is little change in education, anti-discrimination or political participation policies 
towards this direction. 
All in all, the main concept and perspective adopted in Greece to deal with cultural, ethnic and 
religious diversity is that of integration, while notions such as tolerance, acceptatnce, respect or 
recognition are more or less absent from the relevant debates. Yet, integration is used rather loosely 
to refer more often than not to assimilation and much more rarely to a mutual engagement of the 
different groups to form a cohesive society. Interestingly, the long-existing native minorities of the 
country are not seen as relevant to this debate as if the two types of diversity – the native and the 
immigrant – cannot be addressed with the same type of policies. The report questions this artificial 
division between native and incoming diversity and proposes how notions of liberal or egalitarian 
tolerance could provide answers to the diversity challenges that Greece is facing in the 21
st
 century.  
Keywords 
National identity, cultural diversity, ethnic diversity, religion, tolerance, integration, Muslims, Greece, 
Europe, minority, migration 
  
  
1. Introduction  
 
Geographically, Greece is located at the southeastern corner of the European continent, indeed closer 
to the Middle East, Turkey and the Balkans rather than to what is today defined as the ‘core’ of the 
Europe, notably countries like France or Germany. This geographic position of Greece at the fringes 
of the European continent is to a large extent matched by a geopolitically and economically peripheral 
character of the country within the European Union, despite the fact that the successive enlargements 
of the EU to the East in 2004 and 2007 have made Greece more central both culturally and politically. 
The position of Greece however may also be seen as a pivotal one, between East and West. Dominant 
discourses on Greek national identity reflect a geopolitical and cultural ambivalence between being 
‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ (Roudometof, 1999; Tsoukalas, 1993).  
 References to the ‘East’ in the Greek national narrative reflect a notion of ‘eastern danger’ 
(Heraklides, 2001; Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou, 2002; Triandafyllidou 2002) that is 
generally projected to modern Turkey, reflecting both past experiences of subjugation to the Ottoman 
Empire and current tense relations with this country. References to the West and Europe are also 
ambivalent. Modern Greece carries the ‘honourable burden’ of being the heir of ancient Greece, 
identified by modern European intellectual and political elites as the craddle of European modernity. 
This glorious past is both a source of national pride and inspiration and a heavy symbolic burden to the 
extent that modern Greeks cannot stand up to the level of cultural, political or scientific excellence of 
their ancestors.  
 Even though the national narrative managed to incorporate classical Greece with the 
Byzantine tradition creating a unified national history from the 6
th
 century b.c. to this day, the tension 
between Greece’s western and eastern cultural and geopolitical influences remains an important 
feature of Greek identity today (Tsoukalas 2002). Indeed, Greeks have found themselves trapped 
between Hellenism (the western prototype of classical Greece) and Romiosyne (the historical experiences 
of Greece in the last five centuries under the Ottoman Empire) (see also Tziovas, 1994).  
 Although politically Greece has been firmly anchored in western Europe in the post World 
War II period, the cultural positioning of Greece remains ambivalent, modern Greek-ness being of but 
not in Europe (Triandafyllidou, 2002a). While the European-ness of modern Greece has been 
officially confirmed by its accession to the European Communities (later European Union) in 1981, 
the geopolitical, cultural and economic relations between Greece and its fellow member states are 
often fraught with misunderstandings. During the 1990s, the confrontation between Greece and its 
fellow partners in the EU on the Macedonian question
1
 as well as Greece’s unpleasant position as the only 
country who had striven but could not make it to the first phase of the European Monetary Union have 
been two obvious expressions of these tensions.  
The 21st century has brought new developments and new challenges for Greece and its national 
self-understanding. The inclusion of Greece in the first phase of the Euro zone implementation, on 1 
January 2002 has confirmed the Europeanness of the country at the monetary but also at the symbolic 
level (Psimmenos, 2004). Moreover, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe and 
the shifting of the EU geopolitical, cultural and religious borders farther East has made Greece inevitably 
more central geographically and religiously (since other Christian Orthodox countries have joined the EU) 
even though geopolitically it remains quite peripheral  (Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 2003). The economic 
crisis though that Greece is undergoing at the time of writing (spring and fall 2010), the risk of a national 
bankruptcy and of quitting the Euro zone have on one hand emphasised the firm anchoring of political 
elites and citizens to the EU but also greatly shown the weakness of Greece as an actor in the European 
economic and political system. 
                                                     
1 i.e. the question of recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent Republic, the name that 
this last would take, as well as its nationalist claims to what the Greeks deemed as ‘their’ national heritage 
(Triandafyllidou et al. 1997; Roudometof 1996). 
  
The expansion of the EU to the east which continues, even if with a slower pace, with a view to 
incorporating Croatia, the western Balkans and Turkey poses new identity and geopolitical challenges. 
Enlargement is desired as a factor of stability, democracy and peace in the region, but also for economic 
reasons, since many Greek firms are highly oriented towards the Balkan markets. Greek public opinion 
has marked an interresting shift between 2006 and 2008 regarding EU enlargement to southeast Europe 
and especially to Turkey. In 2008, 47% of Greeks declared in favour of the entry of Turkey in the EU 
(Eurobarometre, 2008: 30), contrary to the respective 33% registered in 2006 (Eurobarometre, 2006). The 
possible future accession of Turkey to the EU certainly keeps stiring unsolved identity and geopolitical 
issues, not least the Cyprus question. 
In light of these considerations, this paper first offers a brief excursus on the main factors that 
have conditioned the development of the modern Greek state and the dominant conception of Greek 
national identity. The second part of the paper concentrates on the internal Significant Others 
(Triandafyllidou 1998) of Greek society over the past 30 years with a view to identifying which have 
been the important minority groups that have challenged with their diversity the cohesion and 
homogeneity of Greek society during the last three decades. We cover three distinct time periods: the 
1980s and the end of the Cold War, the 1990s and the rise of multiculturalism in Western Europe but 
also the debacle of Communist regimes and the rise of nationalism in central Eastern Europe, and the 
last decade with the expansion of the EU to the east, the rise of international terrorism and the 
financial and economic crisis of the last couple of years. 
In the second part we shall seek to highlight the aspects of ‘difference’ of specific groups that 
have been particularly contested. Those aspects that the groups advocate as important for their identity 
and that the state or the majority group consider ‘intolerable’ or at least difficult to accommodate. 
Pointing to such challenging differences will help locate different instances in which ‘tolerance’ has 
been an important concept or practice with a view to allowing for diversity to exist. Naturally we shall 
also take note of the competing concepts in favour of a more active accommodation and respect for 
diversity or concepts and behaviours that call for the rejection of diversity and the imposition of not 
only unity but also homogeneity within Greek society. 
Definitions 
 
In order to clarify the focus of this paper we propose here a set of working definitions of the terms 
nation, national heritage, national identity, nationalism and also integration and assimilation. Even 
though in the scholarly literature there is considerable polyphony regarding when a group qualifies to 
be a nation, we consider here a nationa as a named and self-defining human community whose member 
cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic 
territories or “homelands”, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs 
and standardised laws (Smith 2002: 15). A nation presupposes the notion of ‘national identity’ of a 
‘feeling of belonging’ to the nation. The notion of national heritage is defined as a set of cultural forms 
that characterise a specific nation and which provide for the framework within which the members of the 
nation are socialised. 
In sociology and political science the term integration is considered a fuzzy term and for this 
reason quite problematic. A minimal working definition adopted in this work for integration is the 
following: integration is a social, economic and political process that regards the insertion of 
immigrants into their country of destination. Integration requires both the effort of migrants to adapt to 
the new reality and the effort of the host population to adapt to the presence of migrants and the 
changing character of the host society. In common parlance, integration is often confused with 
assimilation. Assimilation is a social process by which the immigrants completely adapt to the 
traditions, culture and mores of the host country, and eventually become part of the host nation 
gradually abandoning their own ethnicity, culture, and traditions. Assimilation is indeed a one-way 
process that involves the effort of immigrants to ‘assimilate’ in the destination country and its 
dominant culture and is in this sense a distinct concept and term from integration 
This report focuses on cultural (customs, mores, life style, language), religious, and ethnic 
(cultural as before or phenotype, related to a specific ethnic descent of a group of people) diversity of 
  
minority groups that have lived in Greece since the creation of the modern Greek state in 1831 and of 
immigrant populations that have arrived in the country during the last twenty years. Terms like 
tolerance, acceptance, respect and recognition as well as multiculturalism and interculturalism are 
discussed in the paper as their definitions in the Greek context are one of the objectives of this study. 
2. Greece and Europe 
2.1 National identity and state formation  
 
While the foundations of Greek nationalism in the late eighteenth century were based on European 
Enlightenment and its civic ideals (Veremis, 1983: 59-60; Kitromilides, 1990: 25-33), the Greek 
nation has eventually been defined in strongly ethno-cultural terms. Common ancestry, culture and 
language have been the main tenets of the development of the modern Greek national identity 
(Veremis, 1983; 1990; Kitromilides, 1983; 1990: 30), together with Christianity – a heritage of the 
Byzantine Empire (constructed essentially as Greek and related linearly to the Greek classical past.) The 
dominant national narrative concluded with Greece’s subjugation to the Ottoman Empire, the national 
resurrection in 1821 and the creation of a small independent Greek state in 1831. A unified national 
consciousness was successfully instilled in Greek society through state policies in military conscription, 
education and cultlure throughout the ninetienth and twentieth century.  
 The state and the political and intellectual elites propagated however for several decades an 
irredentist view of the Greek nation that extended further north to Macedonia and Thrace and further east 
to Minor Asia. This ‘Great Idea’ – to unite all the territories where people who were of Greek ethnicity or 
who spoke the Greek language and shared the Greek culture – dominated Greek politics and the 
successive enlargements of the Greek nation state until the early 20
th
 century. It was only in 1923 and after 
the debacle of the Greek forces in Minor Asia by the Turks that irredentism was largely abandoned. 
Nonetheless the modern Greek state took its present territorial form after World War II when the 
Dodecanese islands were incorporated into Greece in 1948 (Divani 1997). It is this difficult and gradual 
path to the territorial integration of modern Greece that has marked Greek nationalism making the 
conception of Greek citizenship predominantly ethnic, religious and cultural (much less civic and 
territorial) (Christopoulos 2006; see also for a review Triandafyllidou 2001, Chapter 3). 
Although territorial and civic features have gained importance through the expansion and 
consolidation of the national territory, the essence of Greekness is still often defined as a 
transcendental notion in Greek public discourses (Tsoukalas, 1993). The link between the modern 
institutions of the Greek state and the traditional Greek society remains even nowadays puzzling 
(Diamandouros 1983: 47-50). The late and limited industrial development of Greece in conjunction with 
the early introduction of parliamentarism resulted in the distorted functioning of the political system 
through the preservation of traditional power structures under the cover of Western-type institutions 
(Diamandouros 1983; Mouzelis 1986; 1995). 
Modern Greek identity thus developed in a web of complicated relationships that evolved 
around two main contradictions or dilemmas. These contradictions have been articulated in the 
following characteristics of modern Greek identity: a national pride for a unique past; a frustration of 
grandeur ‘lost’ as the modern Greek state emerged into independence as a poor, agricultural economy 
and an incomplete and fragile democracy; an ongoing attempt to bridge the competing universalisms 
and fundamental antagonisms between the secular and rational interpretations of Hellenism advocated 
by Western Enlightenment on the one hand, and by the Byzantine Empire legacy and the conservative 
religious conformism of a strong and very present Eastern Orthodox Church on the other (see 
Tsoukalas 2002, Tziovas 1994); and last but not least a perpetual need to ‘catch up’ with the rest of 
Europe as there was much ground to cover in terms of Greece’s industrialization, modernization, and 
democratic consolidation.  
The intertwining of such contradictory elements has resulted in an ideologically confusing 
notion of ‘Helleno-christianity’ and an underlying East–West tension in Greek identity and politics. 
Greece’s Ottoman past is presented as responsible for the country’s personalized, clientelistic political 
  
culture and a mentality of state patronage; while Great Power politics that were played out across the 
Balkan peninsula throughout the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries have engrained perceptions of threat of foreign 
intervention as regards national independence, territorial integrity and the cohesion of national 
identity.  
2.2 Citizenship in Greece 
 
These features of Greek national identity have marked the definition of Greek citizenship which has 
been based (until 6 months ago) almost exclusively on the jus sanguinis principle
2
.The previews to the 
3838/24.3.2010 laws (voted
 
on March 2010) provided for a separate procedure for acquiring Greek 
nationality (the so called procedure of nationality definition) that has been reserved for people who 
could prove that they were of Greek descent and ‘behave as Greeks’. The terms used for this 
procedure imply that Greek descent and national consciousness exist prior to the acquisition of Greek 
nationality (Christopoulos 2006: 254). This rule refers to people of Greek ethnic origin, the omogeneis 
(meaning those of the same genos, i.e. of the same descent). 
There are two broad categories of omogeneis in Greece currently: the Pontic Greeks 
(numbering a little over 150,000), notably people of Greek descent that resided in the former 
Soviet Republics. The Greek state has adopted a generous naturalisation policy allowing the 
large majority among them to naturalise through a simplified citizenship definition procedure 
called ‘specific naturalisation’ (Christopoulos 2006: 273). The second group of omogeneis 
(co-ethnics) are ethnic Greek Albanians or else known as Voreioipirotes3. These held until 
recently Special Identity Cards for Omogeneis (EDTO)4 issued by the Greek police which 
gave them full socio economic but no political rights in Greece. As of November 2006, a joint 
decision by the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs facilitated the naturalization 
procedure for them, waiving the fee and the discretionary character of the judgment, 
encouraging thus ethnic Greek Albanians thus to naturalise. Indeed this change of policy has 
led to an exponential increase of naturalisations from two-digit numbers each year to several 
thousands. While in the period 1998-2006 only a handful of people had naturalised, in the 
period between 2007 and 2009 approximately 45,000 foreigners, in their vast majority of 
Albanian nationality, have acquired Greek citizenship. 
                                                     
2 
Until March 2010 when law 3838/24.3.2010 was voted, second, or even third-generation immigrant children were not 
entitled to Greek citizenship at birth unless their parents had been naturalised. Law 2130/1993 foresaw that immigrants 
who wished to become Greek citizens had to be residents in Greece for more than ten years in the last twelve calendar 
years. This was one of the longest residence requirements for naturalisation in Europe. Law 2910/2001 (articles 58-64) 
had made the conditions and procedure even more cumbersome, introducing an application fee of 1,500 Euro. In addition 
to that, authorities were not required to reply within a specified period of time and need not justify a negative decision to 
the applicant. A special circular of the Home Affairs Ministry (Circular 32089/10641/26.5.1993) stated that such 
obligations of fair administration are not valid when the matters treated refer to the acquisition, recognition, loss or re-
acquisition of the Greek nationality, rendering thus the whole issue truly exceptional and outside the normal work 
proceedings of state administration. 
3 According to Dodos (1994: 119-121), the term “Vorios Epiros” (Northern Epirus) is a diplomatic and political designation 
that appears after 1913. It has come out of the opposition of the Greek inhabitants of Greece’s border regions to the 
international agreements that determined the borders of the country together with those people’s national fate decided 
against their will, since the areas where they were living in were granted to the new Albanian state. As a geographical 
term, it does not cover anything specific, because the limits of the northern borders of the "Northern Epirus" have never 
been clearly established. In addition, since 1919, even by the most favourable to the Greek positions tracing of borders, 
the importance of the Greek population is not so obvious (Kokkali, 2010). 
4 There were 197,000 EDTO holders on 31 December 2009, according to data released by the Ministry of Interior in 
December 2010. 
  
The distinction between co ethnics and ‘other’ migrants that Greek law had introduced 
as early as 1997 had been subject to severe criticism by NGOs, the liberal press
5
 and 
international organisations (ECRI 2004) for being discriminatory and unfair
6
. ECRI in 
particular had raised concerns regarding the preferential path to citizenship available to 
individuals of Greek origin, noting that there are subjective elements in the assessment of 
such origin, making the applicants liable to discrimination.  
 It was only in March 2010 that the Greek Parliament voted a new law (law n. 3838/2010) on 
citizenship and naturalisation which introduced provisions for the second generation of migrants, 
notably children born in Greece of foreign parents or children born abroad of foreign parents but who 
have completed at least 6 years of schooling in Greece and live in Greece. In either case, these 
children can naturalise by a simple declaration by their parents when they are born or when they 
complete their sixth year of attending a Greek school. The new law also lowers the requirement for 
naturalisation from 10 to 7 years of residence, provided the foreigner has already received the EU long 
term resident status which can be acquired after 5 years of legal residence. The new law also 
introduces local political rights (both passive and active) for foreign residents (living in Greece for 5 
years or more). The new law has made a breakthrough by Greek standards introducing a substantial 
element of jus soli in the concept of Greek citizenship.  Nonetheless, it remains clear to this day that 
Greek citizenship (like Greek national identity) remains strongly defined by ethnic, cultural and 
religious elements rather than by civic or territorial ones.  
 
2.2 The role of Europe and the “West”  
 
In the pre-World War II period, Europe played an indirect role in national self-understandings of 
Greekness: it was part of the classical Greek heritage but also perceived as alien and threatening. 
Culturally speaking, Greece and Europe were constructed by Greek historiography as part of the same 
classical Greek/European civilization. From a political viewpoint however, other European countries 
were seen as – and indeed were actually – ‘foreign powers’ which imposed their interests on Greece 
and interfered wigth domestic affairs. While European foreign powers were perceived also as 
economically and culturally more advanced than Greece, they were also despised because they could 
not ‘compete’ with Greece’s glorious classical heritage. 
 Since the end of World War II Greece has been politicalggly and ideologically part of Western 
Europe. This largely determined the outcome of the Greek civil war (1944-1948) as well as its post 
WWII political history. Western military, trade and energy interests held Greece firmly within the 
Western part of Europe and pulled the country out of its isolation and away from Communist and left-
wing tendencies. Greece joined NATO in 1952 and in 1962 signed a pre-accession agreement with the 
European Communities (EC).  
 During the post war period the stance of Greek social and political actors towards Europe has 
alternated between ‘Europhilia’ and ‘Europhobia’ given the role that various western actors have 
played in Greece’s political history (particularly the UK and the USA), and the way this has translated 
in a deep polarization of domestic politics – between the pro-western right and centre-right and the 
communist and left political forces. The foreign influence over the outcome of the civil war; the 1960s 
political instability and the Colonels’ military coup (1967-1974); the importance of the Marshall Plan 
for the country’s economic recovery; the importance of participating in NATO’s southern flank in the 
context of the Cold War confrontation; Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish dispute, are all factors and 
events that determined Greece’s relationship with the rest of Europe and the West.  
                                                     
5 See, Ios tis Kyriakis, Athens daily, Kyriakatiki Eleftherotipia, 4 January 2004, www.enet.gr/ and Athens Anglophone daily 
Athens News, 7 January 2004, Citizenship backlog, by Kathy Tzilivakis, www.athensnews.gr . Also Greek Helsinki 
Monitor at www.greekhelsinki.gr/bhr/english/index.html.  
6 Greek authorities are generally required to respond within specified time limits to applicants addressed to them and to 
provide justification for their decisions. 
  
  At the level of public attitudes, Kokosalakis and Psimmenos (2002: 24-26) show (on the basis 
of Eurobarometer survey data) that Greeks have been overall positive as regards their country’s 
participation in the EC and later EU, saw no conflict between their national and their European 
identity, and were overall supportive of European unification which they perceived as economically 
and politically advantageous for the country. However, qualitative studies have shown that Greeks 
tend to look at other Europeans as ‘others’ and as ‘different’ to the foundations of Greek tradition and 
collective identity (Anagnostou 2005; Kokosalakis 2004). Indeed, legacies of the past, territorial 
insecurities and antagonistic identities in Greece’s immediate neighbourhood the Balkans, have not 
been easily understood by Western and Northern EU member-states, and have at times been 
exaggerated in Greek politics, largely for domestic political reasons. Indeed, during the 1990s, the 
feeling of alienation that Greeks at times expressed towards the West (Tsoukalas, 1993; 1995) was 
further accentuated by the controversy between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), the failure of resolving the Cyprus question, and the inability of other EU 
countries to appreciate Greece’s sensibility on these issues (Roudometof, 1996; Triandafyllidou et al., 
1997, Triandafyllidou 2007). 
 In the early 21
st
 century a more flexible understanding of Greek national identity seems to 
emerge, mainly due to the increasing salience of European policies and symbols, such as the European 
currency. Besides, the actual experiences of belonging to the European Union reinforce a civic and 
political value component in Greek national identity (Triandafyllidou et al. 1997; Kokosalakis 2004; 
Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou 2007). 
 
3. Cultural diversity challenges during the last 30 years  
 
The new European context at the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first century has raised new 
challenges to Greek national self-understandings and the country’s geopolitical positioning within its 
immediate neighbourhood and of course within the EU and Europe writ large. These challenges are 
related to the continuing (even if slower) expansion of the EU to the Balkans and Turkey.  
 Moreover, during the last two decades, Greece has had to make room – even if hesitantly and 
only to a limited extent – for cultural, ethnic and religious diversity within the nation. These 
developments have had to do with two different population groups: native, historic minorities and 
immigrants. Regarding minorities first, regional legal and institutional frameworks—such as the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)—have furthered progress in promoting the recognition and protection of 
minorities (linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial) across Europe (Psychogiopoulou 2009). This progress 
has also increasingly influenced debates and policies on the position and rights of minorities in 
Greece, which for long has been a sensitive matter in Greek political life and society. Nikiforos 
Diamantouros (1983: 55) had described this ‘sensitivity’ as an indication that the process of national 
integration is incomplete.  
Regarding migrants, even since the early 1980s, Greece can no longer be described as an 
emigration country. The country’s population has increased by 10-12%, with large numbers of 
migrants mainly from the Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria and Romania), ex-Soviet Republics (Georgia, 
Russia and Ukraine) and, increasingly, Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China). Immigration 
poses a challenge to dominant Greek nationalist discourses; there has been a gradual recognition on 
behalf of state institutions and public opinion that Greek society has become de facto multi-cultural 
and multi-ethnic (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009). Tables 1, 2 and 3 below present an overview of 
the size and composition of the immigrant and native minority population in Greece. 
 
  
Table 1 Immigrant Stock in Greece, on 31 December 2009  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Triandafyllidou and Maroufof (2010) SOPEMI report for Greece, December 2010.
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 The estimate of the illegally staying aliens offered by Maroukis (2008) is the most recent scientific estimate of its kind. For 
more information see: http://clandestino.eliamep.gr . 
 
Size of 
immigrant 
stock 
% of total 
resident 
population Source of data 
Legal immigrant 
population 636,258 5.86% 
Stay permits valid at least for 1 day 
during 2009, Ministry of Interior 
Co ethnics from 
Albania 197,814 1.82% 
Data from Ministry of Interior, for 
31 December 2009 
Estimate of irregular 
immigrants 
 
280,000 
 
2.58% 
 
Maroukis (2008), CLANDESTINO 
project
7
 
Total stock of 
foreigners 1,114,072 10.26%   
Total population of 
Greece 10,856,041 100%  LFS, 4th trimester 2009 
    Co-ethnics from the 
Soviet Union 154,000 1.42% 
Secretariat of Greeks abroad, 
Special Census, 2000 
Total stock of 
immigrants and 
naturalized co-ethnics 1,268,072 11.68%   
  
Table 2. National Composition of the Migrant Stock in Greece, 31.12.2009  
 
 
 
                LFS 
4th Tri. 2009 
 
 
Third Country Nationals 
(TCN) 
Valid Permits 
December 2009 
EU Citizens 
Valid Permits 
December 2009 
All foreigners 
(EU and non-EU) 
 
 
Country of 
Origin Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Albania 501,691 59.74% 414,445 70.65%     414,445
8
 56.64% 
Bulgaria 54,492 6.48% 
  
51,006 37.46% 55,909 7.64% 
Georgia 33,870 4.03% 17,655 3.00%     17,655 2.41% 
Romania 33,773 4.02% 
  
38,388 28.19% 41,954 5.73% 
Pakistan 22,965 2.73% 17,097 2.91%     17,097 2.33% 
Russia 19,522 2.32% 13,512 2.30% 
  
13,512 1.84% 
Ukraine  13,748 1.63% 21,644 3.68%     21,644 2.95% 
Bangladesh 12,533 1.49% 5,910 1.00% 
  
5,910 0.80% 
Syria 12,401 1.47% 7,962 1.35%     7,962 1.08% 
Armenia 12,339 1.46% 6,277 1.07% 
  
6,277 0.85% 
Cyprus 11,773 1.40%     5,972 4.38% 5,972 0.81% 
Poland 11,204 1.33% 
  
10,876 7.98% 11,258 1.53% 
Egypt 10,289 1.22% 14,732 2.51%     14,732 2.01% 
Iraq 7,849 0.93% 1,183 0.20% 
  
1,183 0.16% 
India 7,654 0.91% 13,127 2.23%     13,127 1.79% 
UK 7,539 0.89%   
 
7,811 5,73% 7,811 1.06% 
Germany 7,270 0.86%     5,914 4.34% 5,914 0.80% 
Moldova 4,682 0.55% 12,217 2.08% 
  
12,217 1.66% 
Netherlands 3,548 0.42%     2,201 1.61% 2,201 0.30% 
Philippines 3,302 0.39% 9,668 1.64% 
  
9,668 1.32% 
OTHER 47,262 5.62% 31,161 5.31% 13,983 10.27% 45,144 6.17% 
TOTAL 839,706 100.00% 586,590 100.00% 136,151 100% 731,592 100% 
 
Source: Triandafyllidou and Maroufof, 2010, SOPEMI report for Greece. Based on data from National Statistical 
Service of Greece, Labour Force Survey 4
th
 trimester; Ministry of Interior Affairs, Valid Stay Permits on 
December 31
st
 2009; Ministry of Citizen Protection. Registered EU citizens on December 31
st
 2009.   
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Table 3. Native Minorities in Greece 
  
1961-
1991*
* 
1999/today 
1999/today 
Native Minorities 
 Absolute numbers % of the total 
population of 
Greece 
Catholics, Protestants, Jews and new 
religious movements 
 150,000 
1-1,5 
Jews  5,000  
Catholics  50,000  
Protestants  25,000  
Jehovah’s Witnesses   70,000  
    
Muslims of Western Thrace*:   80,000-120,000 0,5 
Turkish-speaking   36,000-54,000***  
Pomaks  28,800-43,200***  
Roma  14,400-21,600***  
    
Roma (all over Greece) 
 300,000-
350,000**** 
2-3 
Arvanites/Arberor  200,000**** 2 
Macedonians (Slav-speaking Greeks)  10,000-30,000**** 2 
Vlachs/Aromanians  200,000**** 2 
Source: Compilation and treatment of data from different sources/estimations (see notes below). 
 
* The Muslims of Western Thrace according to the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 
(Treaty of Lausanne), in 1923, counted for 106,000 individuals. According to the Greek census of 1928, 1940 and 1951, there 
were registered respectively 126,000 individuals, 140,090 individuals and 112,665 individuals (Human Rights Watch, 
‘Greece: The Turks of Western Thrace’, Vol.11, No.1, 1999/January; available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/index.htm#TopOfPage [consulted on the 02/11/2010]. It is to note that the report on 
Muslims of Thrace does not distinguish between the sub-populations that are included in this category (that is to say Roma 
and Pomaks), referring thus to all as ‘Turks of Western Thrace’. 
** Unlike the 1951 census, more recent censuses have not addressed issues of national/ethnic origin, language and religion 
(GHM, Report about Compliance with the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
1999, available at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/Minorities_of_Greece.html [consulted on the 02/11/2010]). Therefore, no 
official data is available and we can only rely on estimations. 
*** Estimation of Alexandris (1988) for the numbers in 1981, according to which from about 120,000 individuals 45% are 
Turkish-speaking, 36% are Pomaks and 18% Roma. According to an estimation of GHM (at 
http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/pomaks.html [consulted on the 02/11/2010]), the Pomaks nowadays count for 
30,000 (i.e. the minimum estimated by Alexandris above mentioned).  
**** Estimation of GHM, Report about Compliance with the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, 1999, available at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/Minorities_of_Greece.html [consulted on the 
02/11/2010].  
 
 
In this section we shall briefly outline the main native and immigrant minority groups of 
Greece. We shall discuss their history, size, main features and investigate the nature of their diversity. 
We shall thus identify the main diversity challenges that they pose to Greek society and seek for 
challenging events that have taken place in recent years. We shall discuss such events and the ways in 
which Greek institutions and society have dealt with them with a view to identifying the relevant 
practices, norms, institutions and the use, if relevant, of concepts such as tolerance, acceptance, 
respect, pluralism, national identity and national heritage. 
Triandafyllidou & Kokkali 
2 
In table 2 below we present schematically the main native and immigrant minority groups and 
identify the diversity dimensions on which they challenge the dominant conception of Greek 
citizenship and national identity.  
 
 
Table 4: Main Minority and Immigrant Groups in Greece and their Dimensions of Difference 
 
Dimensions 
of difference 
Citizenship Racial Ethnic 
 
Religious Cultural  Lingu
istic 
Co-ethnics 
Pontic Greeks     X X 
Ethnic Greek 
Albanians 
X    X  
Native minorities 
Turks/Muslims 
of Western 
Thrace 
  X X X X 
Slav-speaking 
Macedonians 
  X   X 
Immigrants  
Albanians X  X X X X 
Georgians X  X  X X 
Ukrainians X  X X X X 
Asian Muslim 
migrants*  
X X X X X X 
Sub Saharan 
Africans 
X X X  X X 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
* Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Afghani citizens mainly. 
 
Minority groups in Greece can actually be classified into three broad categories in terms of 
their closeness to the majority group. The term ‘national majority’ is here to identify Greek citizens 
born of Greek parents, in Greece, who are Christian Orthodox (at least via a familial affiliation). In 
terms of the national identity and citizenship conception, omogeneis, that is co-ethnics, are the 
minority groups that differ less from the national majority. There are two populations within the larger 
category of co-ethnics: Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek Albanians.  
The second category of minority groups are native minorities, that is people who are 
ethnically, culturally, religiously different from the national majority but which have formed part of 
the modern Greek state since its creation. These include the Muslims of western Thrace (which may 
be further sub-divided into Pomaks, Muslim Roma and ethnic Turks) who are Turkish-speaking, 
Muslims and largely self-identifying as ethnic Turks. There are also however three more native 
minority groups that may be relevant for the ACCEPT PLURALISM study, and these are the 
Macedonians of Greece, Greek Jews and Greek Roma who are Christians.  
The third category of minority groups in Greece are migrant populations. We identify here 
five different populations: Albanians, as the largest group; Georgians and Ukrainians as the second 
and third largest nationalities among immigrants; Asian immigrants and asylum seekers (Pakistanis, 
Bangladeshis, Filipinos and Afghanis) who are Muslims from southeast Asia; and last but not least 
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Sub-Saharan Africans who come from many different countries and are Christians in their large 
majority. 
Omogeneis/Co-ethnics 
 
The Greek national identity and citizenship definition asserts not only the distinction between citizens 
and foreigners but also between omogeneis (co-ethnics) and allogeneis. Omogeneis are the co-ethnics 
who are of Greek ethnic origin – belong to the Greek Christian Orthodox ‘genos’– and allogeneis are 
those who are of another ‘genos’ (Christopoulos 2006: 253). Thus there are ‘allogeneis’ who are 
Greek citizens, e.g. members of the native minorities or naturalised foreigners. And there are 
‘omogeneis’ who are not Greek citizens, e.g. members of the Greek diaspora abroad or emigrants. The 
first category of minority groups that we shall discuss in this report are the ‘omogeneis’, the co-
ethnics. 
 According to the decision of the State Council
9
 no. 2756/1983, the legitimate criterion for one 
to be characterized as a co-ethnic is ‘to belong to the Greek Ethnos’. That is ‘to have Greek national 
consciousness’, which is ‘deduced from characteristics of personality which refer to common descent, 
language, religion, national traditions and extensive knowledge of the historical events of the nation’. 
It may thus seem that having a Greek national consciousness suffices to be a co-ethnic although in 
practice this is not the case. The two criteria: that of ethnic ancestry and that of national consciousness 
are used cumulatively and in the absence of one, it is the ethnic descent criterion that prevails (see also 
Christopoulos 2006).  
Pontic Greeks 
 
Pontic Greeks are ethnic Greeks who either emigrated from areas of the Ottoman empire (the southern 
coast of the Black Sea in particular) to the former Soviet Union in the beginning of this century or left 
Greece in the 1930s and 1940s for political reasons (Glytsos, 1995). The right of Pontic Greeks to 
return to their ‘homeland’ (Greece) has been conceded by presidential decree in 1983. Pontic Greeks are 
defined by the Greek state as members of the diaspora community
10
 who ‘return’ – even though most 
of them had never lived in Greece before – to their ‘homeland’ and are, therefore, given full citizen 
status and benefits aiming to facilitate their integration into Greek society. Pontic Greeks naturalised 
under the ‘definition of nationality’ procedure foreseen by the Greek legislation for people of ethnic Greek 
origin (Christopoulos 2006: 254).  
The peak of their flow was in the early 1990s. Pontic Greeks were citizens of the former 
republics of the Soviet Union who declared an ethnic Greek origin, and on that base were given Greek 
citizenship. In 2000 there were 155,319 Pontic Greeks in the country. More than half of them (about 
80,000) came from Georgia, 31,000 came from Kazakhstan, 23,000 from Russia, and about 9,000 
from Armenia (General Secreteriat of Repatriated Co-Ethnics, 2000). 
 Despite the fact that Pontic Greeks acquired Greek citizenship literally upon arrival and, also, 
that their education level is higher than that of native Greeks
11
, they faced serious problems in finding 
jobs, mainly because they did not speak Greek at a good level, but also because the state did not 
recognise their educational diplomas. The highest percentage of returnees worked as unskilled 
workers. Other common occupations were those of constructors, cleaners and – especially for women 
– housekeeping (General Secretariat of Repatriated Co-Ethnics, 2000). In December 1990, the 
                                                     
9 State Council is the Supreme Administrative Court of Justice in Greece. 
10 With regard to Pontic Greeks see also Journal of Refugee Studies, 1991, Special Issue, 4, 4. 
11 This becomes apparent by comparing the educational level of the Greek population according to the data of the national 
census of 2001 for people over six years old with the data from the census of the General Secretariat of Repatriated Co 
Ethnics, conducted in 2000 (p. 64). For example 10% of the repatriated co-ethnics have graduated from a Technological 
Educational Institute while the correspondent percentage for Greeks is 3%. Also 12% are University graduates while the 
correspondent percentage for Greeks is 8%.  
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government set up the National Institute for the Reception and Rehabilitation of Emigrant and 
Repatriate Co-Ethnic Greeks (Ε.Ι.Υ.Α.Π.Ο.Ε.) (on the basis of art. 8, law 1893/1990) to manage the 
conditions of entrance, residence and work of Pontic Greek returnees. Accommodation, food, education 
for children and for adults, specialized courses of Greek language and professional training have been 
provided within the context of this Institute’s (Kassimati, 1993). EIYAPOE has been dissolved in March 
2003 and Pontic Greeks have largely ‘disappeared’ sociologically to the extent that there is no special 
monitoring of their socio-economic situation any more. 
 Diversity challenges: Pontic Greeks are considered to be similar to native Greeks as regards 
their national consciousness, culture, and religion. They only differ from natives in terms of their 
language (as at least the first generation of returnees spoke Russian and/or Ποντιακά (Pontian 
language) as a mother tongue) and at least the first generation in terms of the socio-economic system 
that they had been brought up in. Representatives of EIYAPOE interviewed by the author in the mid 
1990s considered that the main problem for Pontic Greeks’ socio-economic integration was their 
excessive reliance on the state to provide for anything and their inability to adapt to a free market 
economy. There are unfortunately not enough recent studies to assess this claim however it is clear 
that the cultural and linguistic difference of the Pontic Greeks is still present in Greek society even if 
on the whole it is not perceived as challenging the national unity. Indeed, Pontic Greeks (together with 
other ex-Soviet nationals, such as Georgians, Russians, and in a lesser extent Armenians) dispose a 
non-negligible ‘ethnic infrastructure’, this is to say their own shops, mini-markets, cafés, festivity 
halls, dentists, churches, at least in the city of Thessaloniki where they have mainly settled in the 
1990s (Kokkali 2010).  
Ethnic Greek Albanians 
 
The second large group of co-ethnics that has recently ‘returned’ to Greece are ethnic Greek 
Albanians, widely known as “Vorioepirotes” (Βορειoηπειρώτες). The State Council (judgement no. 
2207/1992) attempted to provide a description of their status: co-ethnics from Albania are the people 
that descend from Greek parents and their place of birth (theirs or their parents) is “Vorios Epirus” 
(Βόρειος Ηπειρος)12. 
As regards Greek Albanians, law 1975/1991, on the basis of article 108 of the Greek 
Constitution, provided them with a preferable legal status as people without the Greek citizenship but 
with the Greek nationality (article 17). Because of their ethnic minority status in southern Albania, 
they were perceived as refugees who suffered persecution and discrimination because of their Greek 
nationality and Christian Orthodox religion. The legal provisions in issues of stay, social security, 
retirement coverage and medical care were of a discretionary positive character as opposed to those 
concerning other categories of foreign immigrants (article 24). 
Even though the law provided for the preferential treatment of Greek Albanians, in practice they 
have not been as privileged as the Pontic Greeks. The Greek government did absolutely not want the 
evacuation of the minority in Albania, and, thus, was very reluctant to the settlement of ethnic Greeks 
from Albania to Greece (Tsoukala, 1997; Dodos, 1994: 142). And that is the reason why the Greek 
state has adopted a different approach towards co-ethnic repatriated Pontic Greeks and co-ethnics from 
the Greek minority in Albania. While the former are accepted as refugees, the latter are 
instrumentalized by the Greek foreign policy: their presence in southern Albania is considered as vital 
for the promotion of the Greek interests there (Pavlou, 2003; Kokkali, 2008: 78, 173 and 2010).  
The legal status of ethnic Greek Albanians has been clarified in detail with the Presidential 
Decree 395/1998. Following from this decree, Greek co-ethnics who are Albanian citizens 
(Voreioepirotes) hold Special Identity Cards for Omogeneis (EDTO) issued by the Greek police. On 
31 December 2009 there were 197,814 Special Identity Cards for Co-Ethnics issued, of which over 
150,000 were of 10-year duration. As of November 2006, holders of these Identity Cards were 
encouraged to apply for citizenship. They were exempted from the high citizenship fee and were 
                                                     
12 See above, Dodos, op.cit. 
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generally grated citizenship if they satisfied the requirements (in other words, no negative discretion 
was exerted). Indeed during the past 3 years more than 40,000 Albanian citizens of ethnic Greek origin 
have acquired Greek citizenship. 
 Diversity Challenges: Ethnic Greek Albanians differ from native Greeks mainly in their 
citizenship and to a lesser extent in their language. Contrary to Pontic Greeks, the use of Greek 
language, especially among the older generation, was more widespread
13
 in southern Albania. Also the 
geographical and cultural proximity was higher – native Greeks of Hepirus in northern Greece and 
ethnic Greeks born in southern Albania had many cultural similarities. Overall ethnic Greek 
Albanians’ public image has also been constructed as ‘positive’, contrasted to that of ‘other’ Albanians 
whose image was negative (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002), at least during the 1990s. The ethnic, 
religious and cultural proximity of ethnic Greek Albanians with native Greeks makes them a minority 
group that is gradually assimilating into Greek society and poses no strong cultural diversity challenge 
to the country. At the same time their presence forces to clarify how national and cultural unity and 
homogeneity is pretty much constructed rather than given depending often on beliefs of common 
genealogical descent more than actual cultural proximity. It is interesting how the cultural diversity of 
Voreioipirotes has been treated during the 2000s by contrasting to how the cultural diversity of ‘other’ 
Albanians has been perceived at the same time. Actually, however, such distinctions seem to have 
faded, since Albanian citizens (either omogeneis or allogeneis) are largely considered as very well 
integrated to the Greek society, while other – more recently arrived – foreigners (such as Afghani, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants or asylum seekers) monopolise the public discourse.  
 
Native minorities 
 
There are a number of native minorities in Greece whose population however is rather small (Clogg 
2002). According to the data provided by international and Greek NGOs the following national, ethno-
linguistic and religious minorities are present in Greece (percentages refer to the total resident 
population): Roma 3.3%; Arvanites 2%; members of the Macedonian minority 2%; Vlachs 2%; Turks 
0.5%; Pomaks 0.3
14
 (Lenkova, 1997; Minority Rights Group (MRG), 1994). Religious minorities, 
which include Catholics, Protestants and new religious movements, make up nearly 1% of the citizens 
of Greece. Among these minorities, the Greek State only recognises the existence of the Muslims of 
western Thrace, the Roma population and Greek Catholics and Protestants.  
Since official recognition of other minorities of any kind is withheld, these groups are 
subjected to discriminatory treatment, whether at the collective and individual level. The recent 
mobilisation of the Macedonian minority (during the 1990s) has been dealt with by refuting its 
existence and persecuting its activists (Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM), 1998: Kostopoulos 2000). In 
this report we shall only discuss the two numerically important native minorities in the country: the 
Muslims of western Thrace and the Macedonians in northwestern Greece. 
                                                     
13 Even though the use of Greek language was mainly confined to private homes and only in southern Albania in the Greek 
inhabited villages. Often ethnic Greek Albanians were moved to Tirana and other areas for work where they could not 
speak the Greek language and hence many of them were no longer fluent in it. 
14 Arvanites are a Christian Orthodox minority that originates from northern Albania and migrated to continental Greece in 
the late middle ages. Vlachs are a Christian Orthodox minority native of Greece. There are however important Vlach 
populations across the Balkans and even in Central Europe. Vlachs are sub-divided in several ethnic sub-groups and are 
preodominantly Christian Orthodox. Both populations (the Arvanites and the Vlachs) are considered today to be totally 
assimilated to the dominant Greek national identity and culture even if Vlachs in particular may have their group-specific 
cultural festivities. Pomaks are a local Muslim population that lives in the Rhodope mountains on both sides of the Greek 
Bulgarian border. In Bulgaria they are considered Bulgarian Muslims while in Greece they are seen as part of the larger 
Muslim population of Western Thrace (see also Clogg 2002 and Rozakis 1996; 2000). 
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Muslims of western Thrace 
 
The border region of Western Thrace in the northeast part of Greece is home to a small but politically 
significant population of about 120,000 Muslims, inhabiting the region together with a Greek 
Christian majority.
15
 With its strategic location between three states and two continents, the Muslim 
community of Western Thrace marks a particular kind of geographical and cultural-historical 
boundary between East and West. In Europe’s southernmost corner, the region of Thrace borders with 
Turkey to the east and Bulgaria to the north. Across the northern border, Bulgaria’s south and 
southeast regions are also home to large and territorially concentrated Turkish communities, portions 
of the country’s sizeable Turkish minority.16 
Thrace’s Muslim community was exempt correspondingly with the Greeks of Istanbul, from 
the mandatory population exchange between Greece and Turkey agreed with the Treaty of Lausanne 
(1923). Signed in the aftermath of Greece’s military debacle in Anatolia, the international Treaty of 
Lausanne includes a section on the ‘Protection of Minorities’, a bilateral agreement between Greece 
and Turkey containing a series of provisions to guarantee the rights of the exempted minority 
populations (including Islamic law (shari’a) for family and inheritance matters).17   
 Comprising individuals of Turkish origin, Gypsies (Roma), and Slav-speaking Pomaks, the 
Muslims of Thrace prior to World War II coexisted largely as a religious community characteristic of 
the Ottoman millet system. Since the 1950s, however, they have transformed into a minority with 
ethnic consciousness, and in the past twenty years they have mobilized to assert a common Turkish 
identity. The latter has caused a major and ongoing rift with Greek authorities who officially recognize 
a ‘Muslim minority’ in reference to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 that has defined the status of the 
latter until the present.  
 Despite Greece’s transition to democracy in 1974, state relations with the minority in Thrace 
deteriorated due to the deepening crisis with Turkey after the invasion of Cyprus. A series of 
restrictive measures adopted by the Greek governments deprived the Muslim population of basic 
social and economic rights. In protest, in the second half of the 1980s the minority mobilized 
politically on the basis of Turkish nationalism, supporting independent minority candidates in 
parliamentary elections, who were not affiliated with Greek political parties. The accompanying 
tensions that erupted between Muslims and Christians in the region in early 1990 marked a turning 
point; they made clear the failure of the previous discriminatory policy, pointing to the need for 
change.  
Alarmed by tumultuous conditions in Thrace at the turn of the decade, the Greek government 
decided in 1991 to abolish the discriminatory measures and announced a new approach towards the 
minority to be guided by ‘legal equality – equal citizenship’ (isonomeia-isopoliteia). Such an approach 
was for the first time put to practice through a new regional development strategy for border regions, 
which was launched with the Findings of the Inter-party Committee for Border Regions submitted to 
the Greek Parliament in 1992.
18
  
Recent research (Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou 2007) shows that overall ethnic 
identification matters less today in Thrace than it used to 20 years ago. However, past divisions and 
                                                     
15 The overall (resident) population of Thrace is 358,426 (www.e-demography.gr, 2010). The precise size of the Turkish 
Muslim population is a matter of dispute due to their large-scale immigration over the years and the lack of an official 
census since the 1950s. Estimates range from 90,000 to over 120,000 while official accounts put it between 110,000-
135,000 (see The Muslim Minority in Greece, Athens: ELIAMEP, 1995). Alexandris estimated the minority in 1981 to 
be about 120,000, with 45% Turkish-speaking, 36% Pomaks and 18% Roma (Alexandris 1988: 524). 
16 For a detailed discussion see the research project EUROREG, Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou (2006), 
http://central.radiopod.gr/en/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/case_study_report_thrace.pdf, last accessed on 14 June 2010. 
17 The Greek Civil Code provides Muslim women the right to chose whether to take a case to religious as opposed to the 
civil court and thus individuals presumably submit their case voluntarily to them. For a critical discussion of the Islamic 
law system in Thrace see Ktistakis (2006) and Tsitselikis (2004). 
18 Findings of the Inter-party Committee for Border Regions, Greek Parliament, Athens, 14 February 1992. Appended in I 
Anaptixi tis Anatolikis Makedonias kai Thrakis (1995). 
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discrimination, although much attenuated now, often persist. They may persist less in the form of 
institutional discrimination but they do in the form of attitudes and implicit favouring of majority 
members at the expense of minority ones. Turkish and Greek nationalism remains salient among 
minority and majority leaders and social-political actors, yet, it has become significantly moderated 
over the past 15 years. Exclusive conceptions of national-ethnic identity and solidarity are not as 
pervasive but are subject to alternative and diverse understandings, as well as more subject to intra-
communal challenge among both minority and majority.  
A number of individuals, particularly among the younger generation of the minority, are 
critical of Turkish nationalism in so far as its politics involve and depend upon the patronage of 
Turkey. At the same time, they support the right to self-determination as an ethnic Turkish minority. 
In a parallel fashion, despite opposition to the demand for minority recognition as ethnic Turkish, 
nationalism among Greek Christians also seems to have lost some of its exclusive quality and political 
rigour of the previous decade. Greek elites and Greek public opinion however remain largely worried 
that the minority’s claim to define itself collectively as Turkish is a national claim, re-opening the 
question of state borders between Greece and Turkey and allowing for Turkey to interfere in Greek 
internal affairs. 
Diversity challenges: The Turks of Thrace pose an important ethnic and religious diversity 
challenge for Greece as they question its ethnic and religious homogeneity. They share with other 
Greek citizens neither their genealogical descent nor the religion – they differ in the two fundamental 
elements that define the dominant vision of Greek national identity and citizenship. Their claims for 
collective recognition of their ethnic identity have generally been met with intolerance and rejection. 
At the same time Greece has been pressurised by the policies of the Council of Europe and by the 
European Court of Human Rights to adapt and update its policy towards its largest native ethnic 
minority. It has thus abolished the infamous article 18 of the Greek Nationality Code which had been 
used discretionary to deprive members of the minority from their Greek citizenship unilaterally. 
Overall Greek policies towards the minority have become more liberal, defending the equality 
of individuals before the law and the state no matter what their collective affiliation is in terms of 
religion. These policies however have been defended in the name of the common, compact and unitary 
national interest, that is the Greek Christian Orthodox majority’s interest (Anagnostou 2005) not by 
reference to human rights norms. There is no re-consideration or re-definition of what it means to be 
Greek or a sort of collective level recognition of the existence of minorities that are part of the Greek 
nation state. There is as yet no room for these minorities to contribute to the definition of what it 
means to be Greek in the 21
st
 century. 
Interesting key events, where the tolerance and intolerance of the Greek state institutions, the 
norms applied as well as everyday practices adopted can be tested, is the quest of two different cultural 
associations to include the word Turkish in their title, the rejection of this request by the Greek 
Supreme Court (decision of January 2005) and the condemnation of Greece on this issue by the 
European Court of Human Rights in 2007 (Human Rights Papers, 2008). Additionally, it would be 
interesting to explore the political juxtaposition and the reactions of the society arisen after the 
announcement of Gulbeyaz Karahasan’s (a young Muslim woman) candidature in the 2007 regional 
elections by the leader of the socialist party (PASOK) and current Prime Minister George Papandreou 
(Skoulariki 2009: 69-93). 
Members of the Slavic-speaking Macedonian minority  
 
When the southern part of the geographic region of Macedonia was incorporated into Greece, as the 
Greek region of Macedonia, in 1912, a large part of its population was neither Greek-speaking nor 
identified as of Greek ethnicity (Slavic speakers at 1903 were estimated at 500,000, accounting for 
60% of the local population, Kostopoulos 2002: 25). The Slavic speaking population in Greece has 
been declining in the inter-war period (as a result of the Balkan wars (1912-14), the first World War 
(1914-1918) and the compulsory exchange and/or ‘voluntary’ ethnic unmixing of populations that 
ensued). After the Second World War and the civil war that ravaged Greece in 1946-48, this 
population was further reduced. In 1951, the national census of Greece found that there were 36,000 
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Slavic-speakers living in Macedonia but a classified document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
(Kostopoulos 2002: 223, footnote: 2) estimate the same population to be 120,000-150,000 strong. 
 The Slavic-speaking population of Greek Macedonia was and still is characterised by an 
ethnic and cultural consciousness related to the speaking of the Macedonian language, also referred by 
local people as ‘our language’, the ‘local language’, or the ‘old’ language. The Macedonian Slavic 
language is a Slavic tongue which resembles more to Bulgarian than to Serbian. It has been heavily 
influenced by the languages of the neighbouring states and includes a variety of slightly different local 
dialects (Kostopoulos 2002: 33, 43). 
 Following the civil war and as part of a policy of forging a common national consciousness 
and identity based on the Greek language, the dominant Greek culture, and the suppression of cultural, 
linguistic and religious minority identities, the Slavic-speaking minority of Greek Macedonia 
underwent a process of forced cultural assimilation. Its members were largely obliged to assimilate 
culturally as well as to adopt a Greek national consciousness. By contrast, the language and local 
customs survived to a certain extent within the homes and in everyday communication in many of the 
villages of the Florina and Pella prefectures.
19
 
 Diversity challenges: Following the implosion of the Communist regimes in Central Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans in 1989 and the ensuing (re-)awakening of nations in the region, the federal 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia proclaimed its independence. The formation of an independent 
Macedonian Republic (and no longer a federal one) was met with outrage by Greece (by both Greek 
governments and Greek citizens, see Roudometof 1996, Triandafyllidou et al. 1997) and contributed to 
the emergence of a strong current of defensive Greek nationalism. At the same time, the creation of 
the new independent state and its claim for the existence of a Macedonian nation led a part of the 
Slavic-speaking populations in northern Greece to ask for their recognition as a cultural and ethnic 
minority living in Greece. It asked for the Macedonian language to be introduced in schools and for 
the local culture to be recognised and cultivated (see the Rainbow party platform at the European 
election of 1994). Interestingly the existence of a Slavic speaking Macedonian minority in Greece was 
mentioned in the State department report on human rights in the world in 1990, which stated that 
Greece was suppressing this and other ethnic and linguistic minorities living in its territory. 
 Nonetheless, Greek authorities refused to recognise that such a minority exists and sought to 
suppress the Macedonian ethnic movement by, for instance, refusing to recognise the foundation of a 
cultural Macedonian association (in 1994). Greece was later (in 1998) condemned by the European 
Court of Human Rights for this refusal.  The Greek Macedonian minority organised into a political 
party, the Rainbow party, which obtained 7,263 votes in the national election of 1993 of which 2,250 
in the prefecture of Florina (corresponding to 5% approximately of the total vote). At the European 
election the same party gathered 26,000 votes approximately.  
 During this last decade the question of the Slavic speaking minority in Greek Macedonia has 
lost much of its fervour. Macedonian identity is still celebrated at local fairs but political mobilisation 
has diminished. The Greek state has continued to deny the existence of the minority (with the support 
of the majority of Greek intellectuals, see also Kostopoulos 2002: 329ff.). 
 While the case of Slavic speaking Macedonians of Greece poses clearly questions of 
(in)tolerance of cultural diversity in Greece as well as the question of how plural or indeed mono-
cultural and mono-ethnic is Greek national identity and the definition of Greek citizenship, this group 
cannot be said to have raised important challenges in terms of public policy or everyday practice 
during the last years. 
Roma of Greece 
 
Roma populations are believed to be of Indian origin arriving in Europe in the 11
th
 century (Fraser, 
1995). In line with the general confusion regarding the identities of different Roma/Gypsy 
                                                     
19 See also Mackridge and Yannakakis (1997), Karakasidou (1997) 
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populations, there is uncertainty about this issue in Greece too
20
. Greek historians’ attempts to account 
for the Roma presence in Greek history have often contributed to the negative stereotyping of their 
behaviour and ways of life, often stirring thus anti-Romani discourses in Greece (ERRI and GHM, 
2003).  
Racist stereotyping of the Roma can already be traced already under the Ottoman Empire. 
Indeed, under the Ottoman rule, the Roma were differentiated by their ethnicity from the rest of the 
population, not falling thus under none of the two categories of the Empire’s population, the ‘true 
believers’ and the ‘infidels’ (raya). Both the Ottomans and the raya are thought to have been looking 
down on the Roma (Marushiakova and Popov, 2001: 46-47, cited in ERRI and GHM, op.cit.). 
However, unlike the rest of Europe, the Ottoman administration was the only one to spare the Roma 
from persecution (Fraser, 1995). 
Following the typical urban organisation of the Ottoman cities in which people were 
segregated according to ethnicity and faith (Karadimou-Gerolympou, 1997: 22-30, 87), the Roma had 
their own neighbourhoods. The newborn Greek state (1830) put an end to this ethnic plurality – social 
and spatial. As any other ethnic minority in Greece, the Roma were subjected to homogenisation, to 
the imposition of the dominant Greek identity and history and to the misrecognition of their cultural 
difference. During World War II, the Roma of Greece suffered persecution from the Nazis and, in 
some cases, even deportation and concentration into camps in Germany, although accurate figures are 
not available (ERRI and GHM, 2003; EODM, 2002: 2-3).  
According to the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (NAPSI) 2008-2010, Roma are 
considered Greeks with no separate ethnic identity (NCHR, 2009). They are not recognized as a 
national minority by the Greek State (Abdikeeva et al. , 2005; Pavlou, 2009: 33)
21
, which accepts this 
term only for those groups explicitly mentioned in bilateral treaties – namely the 1923 Lausanne 
Treaty, according to which there is a 12,000-person Roma population, as part of the recognised 
Muslim minority of Western Thrace. Roma people outside Thrace are not considered by the Greek 
authorities as members of a minority, but as a ‘vulnerable social group’ (CommDH, 2009; cited in 
Pavlou, op.cit.).  
The 1951 census registered 7,429 individuals with Romani as their mother tongue in Greece 
(Tsitselikis, 1996), but this number appears to comprise only Roma who lived in Western Thrace 
(Zenginis, 1994: 20; cited in Alexandris, 2004). Given that since 1951 the Greek censuses do not 
collect data on ethnic affiliation, language or religion, there is no official registration of the Roma 
populations in Greece.  
The size of the Roma population in Greece is actually unknown and it seems to vary according 
to source and purpose
22
. Yet, recent estimations
23
 concord into the number given by the Minority 
Rights Group-Greece, i.e. 300-350,000 people, half of whom are tent-dwelling Rom. 
                                                     
20
 For a discussion on the origins of the Roma populations see also Matras (2002). For the origins of the Roma populations in 
Greece see EODM (2002: 1-3) and also the DIKADI-ROM (Network for fighting discrimination against Rom) website 
at: http://www.rom.net.gr 
21
 The UN Human Rights Council, McDougall report (2009) highlights that the Greek government does not 
consider the Roma a minority within Greece, rather a vulnerable social group consisting of 250,000 to 
300,000 persons. According to the government, this viewpoint is shared by Roma who consider themselves 
an integral part of Greek society (cited in Pavlou, 2009: 33). According to Pavlou (2009), the choice of the 
Greek state (based also on the self-identification of Greek Roma as ‘Zingani’) to use the denotation ‘gypsies’ 
for Greek Roma is related to its reluctance to accept that Roma constitute a ‘minority’ as a social group, 
protected by international legal instruments. 
22
 Rinne (2002) suggests that when raising funds from the European Union for the improvement of the Roma situation, 
Greece officially presents a Roma population of 300,000 individuals, which otherwise decreases to some 100-120,000 or 
less.  
According to a Statement by the Greek Delegation in the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, inWarsaw, 17–
27 September 2001, Roma in Greece count for to 120,000–150,000 individuals (cited in Abdikeeva et al.,2005 and 
available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/hdim2001/statements.php3?topic=4a&author=23). In 2003, according to the 
Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (Response of Greece to the MG-S-ROM questionnaire 
on the rights of Roma in Council of Europe member states, Doc. Ref. No. 30823, 31243, 8 August 2003, p. 1), there were 
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Despite their centuries-long presence in Greece, most Roma were stateless until 1955 and 
were regarded as ‘aliens of Gypsy descent’. On the contrary, the Muslim Roma of the western 
Thrace
24
 (covered by the provisions of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty), obtained citizenship in the 1920s, 
despite their later settling in Greece (compared to those that had already settled in the Helladic space 
long before 1923). Those later exempt, the rest were issued with a residence permit from the Aliens 
Department of the Greek Police that had to be renewed every two years. Law 3370/20-9-1955 has 
been the first effort made in Greece to provide citizenship to the many stateless Roma. Despite the 
enactment of the new law and an amendment adopted in 1968, the majority of Roma remained 
stateless, what then prompted the Greek authorities to issue Decrees 69468/212 and 16701/51 
(respectively in 1978 and 1979) in order to facilitate the acquisition of Greek citizenship by those who 
had not benefited from the 1955 law (Alexandris, 2004; Roughieri, 2000; Abdikeeva et al., 2005: 6). 
Even after citizenship acquisition, the Roma of Greece still face marked discrimination and 
social exclusion
25
, the main types of which include: 
 Spatial segregation, appalling housing conditions and eviction from their settlements: All 
national and international reports on Greece agree that Roma live under heavy spatial and social 
segregation (Pavlou, 2009: 12-13). Allegedly, Pavlou (op.cit.) suggests that the only regulatory 
framework providing for Roma settlements promotes segregation and ghettoisation
26
. Moreover, 
Roma in Greece are frequently faced with forced eviction (and/or the threat of forced eviction), the 
subsequent demolition of their homes, destruction of property, etc. Many evictions are linked to major 
sport or cultural events, in which cases Roma must be made invisible or removed at any cost (Pavlou, 
op.cit.). A telling example of this is the 2004 Olympic Games of Athens that have been exploited by 
the region’s local authorities as a pretext for evicting Roma (ERRI and GHM, 2003). The brushing up 
of the capital’s image in view of the 2004 Olympic Games is only one among the reasons for the 
forced evictions. According to Alexandris (2004) and Rinne (2002), the traditional hostility of the 
local authorities, who perceive the existence of Roma in vicinity to their localities as a threat to public 
order, as well as a source of crime (drug dealing, thievery, etc.), is another reason behind their frequent 
evictions.  
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has noted, already in its 
Second Report on Greece (1999), that Roma living in settlements often face extremely harsh living 
conditions. Similarly, the more recent report of HLHR-KEMO/i-RED on the ‘Housing conditions of 
Roma and Travellers in Greece’ (October 2009)27 suggests that ‘inhuman and degrading conditions, as 
well as the deprivation of a wide range of their fundamental rights is the common conclusion met in 
different national and international reports on housing of Roma minority in Greece […]. Roma live in 
tragic conditions right next to dumps, in shacks, without water and electricity, without basic hygiene, 
among rodents, and at the mercy of extreme weather conditions and phenomena, affected by epidemic 
diseases, mainly caused by the trash they are paid to collect and remove’.  
Police violence towards Roma and persistent identity-controls in their settlements: Abusive 
police behavior towards Roma is a major issue when considering this particular population (Pavlou, 
2009: 13; ERRI/GHM, 2003; ECRI, 2009: 32), and one of the main issues raised in the complaints that 
have been handled by the Greek Ombudsman in recent years. More precisely the complains are 
(Contd.)                                                                  
70,000–80,000 Roma people in Greece (Abdikeeva et al., 2005). Mavrommatis (2004) refers to 150,000-300,000 
persons, pointing out that the Greek state accepts the number of 80,000 of whom 25,000 (or 4,000 families) are 
travellers/nomads. According to DIKADI-ROM (Network for fighting discrimination against Rom), Roma in Greece 
count for 160-200,000 individuals (see http://www.rom.net.gr/node/3).  
23
 See for instance, the Hellenic Agency for Local Development and Local Government (2001: 45; cited in Abdikeeva et al., 
2005: 6); Pavlou, 2009; ERRI and GHM, 2003). For an exhaustive list of Romani communities in Greece, see the Annex.  
24
 For a critical overview of their situation, see Troumpeta (2001 and 2008). 
25
 For a selection of discriminatory incidents against Roma people, see the special edition of the quarterly Roma Rights 
(March 2001) Focus: Roma in Greece, referred to herein as Cahn (2001).  
26
 According to Pavlou (2009: 12), there are no official or unofficial quantitative data available on regulated or 
unregulated encampments, ownership, social housing, private renting or household types. 
27
 This report is referred to herein as Pavlou, 2009.  
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related, first, to misbehavior on the part of the police in individual cases, as well as excessive use of 
force, ill-treatment and verbal abuse; second, to the excessive use of force and illegal massive controls 
in camps, where all residents are treated as suspicious or even guilty of specific crimes or offences; 
third, to the Police involvement in the evictions of Roma from their camps in co-operation with the 
local authorities. The illegal character of the procedure of investigation followed by the police was one 
of the main issues on which the Greek Ombudsman has been focused (Lykovardi, 2006). It should be 
stressed, however, that, according to Kalliopi Lykovardi, Senior Investigator in the Greek 
Ombudsman’s Office/Human Rights Department, since 2001, the Greek Ombudsman has received no 
reports indicating that massive investigations and controls in Roma camps continue (op.cit.). 
Exclusion of Roma from the Educational System: A combination of racial discrimination and 
extreme poverty makes that very few Romani children complete even the basic primary education
28
. 
The children are all too often subjected to segregation in ghetto schools and Roma-only classes that – 
most of times – provide inferior education29. Municipal and school authorities have actively hindered 
access of Romani children to education by refusing to register Romani students in local schools and 
dispersing them to schools far away from their places of residence as well as by failing to provide 
school transport for Roma (ERRI and GHM, 2003; Marantzidis and Mavrommatis, 1999; ERRI, 2003; 
ECRI, 2009). 
 Barriers to Access to Health Care and Other Social Support Services: It is not exceptional for 
Romani individuals to lack basic identity documents, what then makes it impossible for them to claim 
necessary health care and state social benefits. ERRI and GHM (2003) report that, in a number of 
Greek municipalities
30
, local authorities have refused to register factually residing Roma as residents, 
effectively precluding them from access to public services (such as hospitals) necessary for the 
realisation of a number of fundamental social and economic rights (such as enrollment to school).  
As a consequence Romani people and most particularly children are entrapped in a vicious 
circle, in which lack of official documents affects their health, education and living conditions (ERRI 
and GHM, op.cit. ; ECRI, 2009. See also Divani, 2008). Romani children are not sufficiently 
vaccinated because they fail to attend school regularly, but also because of the lack of readily-
understandable information available to their mothers. But, the insufficient vaccination hinders their 
enrolment at school anyway. 
Employment: Only few Roma are employed in the mainstream labour market, and this is 
mainly related to discrimination and prejudice, but also to their lack of qualifications (as a result of a 
low education). Most Roma living in settlements earn their income from scrap and garbage collection, 
while Roma in rural settlements occasionally earn a living by seasonal agricultural work. All above 
types of work are usually informal, thus not giving access to health or social insurance. It seems that 
many claim it is difficult and expensive to obtain the necessary permits, what then may lead to 
problems with the authorities (Abdikeeva et al., 2005).  
According to the National Commission on Human Rights (NCHR, 2008), due to low levels of 
education and illiteracy, only an estimated 40 per cent of Roma have a job from which they can make 
a living. However, apart from education and housing, Roma suffer serious discrimination also in 
                                                     
28
 Dropping out rates are very high. A 1998 survey of school-aged Romani children in a number of Greece’s more exposed 
Romani settlements by DEPOS revealed that only 23% of Romani children of secondary school age in settlements have 
ever been to school and only 4.3% of this number attend regularly. Similarly, only 21% of Romani children of primary 
school age in settlements have ever been to school and just 13% of those who had started had continued to attend (ERRI, 
op.cit.). The same source offers an overview of the situation in different regions of Greece based on several empirical 
studies. All the findings consent on that the overwhelming majority of Roma children remain in practice illiterate. For 
more on the exclusion of Romani children in education, see also: http://www.rom.net.gr/node/105 , as well as Gotovos 
(2004) that presents research findings from the Research Project “Roma children education” carried out by the 
Department of Education of the University of Ioannina.  
29
 See the press release of the ERRC, on 10 August 2010, at: http://www.ercc.org and http://cm.greekhelsinki.gr. In the same, 
see also a list of the schools involved in such practices all over Greece. 
30
 For instance, ECRI reports that, in Spata and Aspropyrgos of the Athenian agglomeration, Roma living in settlements do 
not benefit from the requisite attention from the local social services. (ECRI, 2009: 32).  
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employment from members of the majority group, without exempting public officials and officials at 
the local level (ECRI, 2009: 31). This is a key issue to their unemployment or under-employment.  
 Diversity challenges: The Roma have always posed important ethnic and cultural challenges 
for Greece.
31
 Their phenotypic features (colour of skin, face traits) and their traditions and way of life 
(tent-dwelling, nomadic, traditional dress code for women, under age marriages, patriarchal extended 
families) make them appear alien to the Greek nation despite their centuries-long presence in the 
country. Even though a large part of the Roma populations in Greece are Christian, religion does not 
seem to matter here as a bridge between the majority population and the Roma minority. The Roma in 
western Thrace are also a more complex case as they are also discriminated against within their own 
Muslim community (Troumpeta, 2001).    
 
Immigrants 
 
The third category of minority groups that live in Greece are economic migrants that arrived in the 
country during the past two decades. We have identified here the three largest groups (see table 2 
above), notably Albanians, Georgians and Ukrainians and also two smaller immigrant populations, 
notably southeast Asians and sub Saharan Africans, mainly because these last have been increasingly 
visible during the last year (although they have been present in relatively small numbers in the country 
for at least 2 decades) and because of their religious (in the case of southeast Asians) and racial (in the 
case of sub Saharan Africans) difference from the national majority population. 
Albanians 
 
Albanian migration to Greece took massively place basically in two periods: in 1991 (following the 
collapse of the Albanian economy and polity) and in 1997 (after another crisis due to the implosion of 
the financial pyramid schemes). The availability of various access points from the difficult to guard 
mountainous north-western border of Greece and the proximity of this latter to Albania, together with 
the reactivation of existent post-WWII societal networks of kinship, friendship, partnership, etc. (that 
stayed ‘frozen’ for nearly 50 years due to the isolation Enver Hoxha imposed to Albania in the 1950s) 
(Kokkali 2010 and 2008: 214-218, Sintès 2002) were among the main factors that qualified Greece as 
by far the major migratory destination for Albanians during the 1990s. In addition the attraction of 
Greece’s large grey economy to undocumented immigrants (who saw in this a rapid economic 
integration) played a role (Kokkali op.cit.).  
Gradually, during the last twenty years, a substantial part of Albanian migrants have settled in 
Greece. Still, different patterns of migration and various ideal-types of the immigrant can be 
distinguished among Albanians, basically those who have brought their families in Greece and those 
who did not. Generally speaking, the former enjoyed much more acceptance from the local 
communities than the latter, who – in many cases – remained isolated from the “autochthones” and 
enclosed themselves in exclusively male Albanian-speaking milieus with poor linguistic abilities in 
Greek (Kokkali 2010). By offering cheap, unqualified labor thus filling the gaps of the Greek 
economy, Albanians were firstly employed in any possible job. They have been working mainly in 
construction, agriculture, small industries and a number of other sectors (commerce, transport, hotels 
and restaurants). Gradually, some have started their own little business of cleansing or slight-repairing 
of apartments, in which they have been employing other Albanians, mostly relatives. Albanian women 
work as domestic workers, in the food and catering industry, in tourism and in agriculture. Lyberaki 
and Maroukis (2004) also showed that Albanian women are progressively moving out from unskilled 
work and cleaning services to become housewives, if they can afford it. 
                                                     
31 Unsurprisingly, Greek language and culture had an important impact on Romani language and culture. Words derived 
from Greek make up by far the largest component of the so-called “inherited lexicon” of Romani (ERRI and GHM, 
2003).  
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  It is very difficult to talk of integration (if integration is defined as a binary process that 
involves both the immigrant and the society of settlement). Greek public opinion, Greek media and the 
state have viewed immigrants and Albanians in particular firstly with suspicion and resentment, 
harshly stigmatising them
32
, then with a paternalistic and utilitarian spirit (since, according to the post-
2000 campaign in politics and the media, immigrants are beneficial to the Greek economy, while 
Albanians in particular have largely contributed in the construction works needed for the organization 
of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens) (Pavlou 2009). The adaptation strategies that many Albanians 
have used in Greece, i.e. name-changing and, in some cases, christening (especially of the children 
belonging to families of Muslim affiliation), offer an exemplary indication of how the Albanians’ 
otherness is silenced or at least dissimulated so as to fit in Greek society
33
. 
 Their cultural difference from Greeks is however rather small concerning mainly language and 
religion. Albanian immigrants are generally fluent in Greek, even the older generation which may not 
write or read Greek properly but generally speak it quite well. In terms of religion, there are many 
migrants who declare themselves atheists
34
. Yet, it is important to stress that, before the total abolition 
of all religious practice in Albania, the population was divided into four major religions (Sunni and 
Bektashi Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism), 70% being Muslim. But for Albanians, the religious 
affiliation is more a form of social organization than religious belief. As such, religion is seen as 
inseparable from a certain ‘nature’, what then means that a person cannot flee the belonging 
represented by his/her religious affiliation, even if s/he was converted (De Rapper, 2002). In other 
words, since religion is intrinsic to origin and birth, display a different religion or declare oneself 
atheist is a merely superficial act that changes nothing, and, in any case, cannot alter the person’s 
‘nature’ (Kokkali 2010).  
During the 1990s and the early 2000s, there have been marked incidents of xenophobia, 
racism, even more than intolerance towards Albanians. A well known example are the problems that 
had arisen at the beginning of this decade when Albanian pupils excelled in their classes and were 
entitled to carry the Greek flag in the national independence day during the school parade. While the 
law was clear: the best pupil in the class should carry the flag, in many schools parents, first and 
foremost, of native children and secondarily teachers and other local actors contested this right of the 
Albanian pupils arguing that the flag could not be carried by foreigners. While the Ministry of 
Education insisted that the law be respected and that the nationality of the children was not a criterion, 
several Albanian children conceded their place to the second best native Greek under the moral 
pressure of the school environment.  
As Pavlou (2009) points out, this kind of incidents and tensions has been smothered with time 
and, today, a new generation with multiple cultural references and identities has arisen. Still, he 
recognises that this is not an irreversible conversion, to the extent that the actual discourse on 
immigrants is widely based on utilitarianism and the maintenance of socio-economic correlations of 
power between autochthones and immigrants. Besides, the on-going economic crisis in Greece will 
probably invalidate the arguments of the immigrants’ positive contribution to the national economy, 
what then might lead to the reappearance of wide-spread racist discourse and violence (2009: 54).  
 Research material drawn from a recent research project reveals interesting facts about 
Albanian immigrants’ housing patterns (Kotzamanis 2006). Overall, only few are those who seem to 
live under very poor conditions (e.g. in temporary structures or hotels), while the majority lives in a 
house or apartment. With time, important improving in their housing conditions is registered. Usually, 
migrants share their home with members of the nuclear family (spouses and children) or other relatives or Albanian friends. Rents are considered high 
                                                     
32 During the 1990s, Albanians have been generally faced with negative stereotyping in the media (presented as ‘criminals’, 
‘backwards’, ‘uncivilised’ – often in stark opposition to the good, honest, hard working ethnic Greek Albanians) (Pavlou 
2001, Triandafyllidou 2002) 
33 Those strategies constitute, however, a more complicated issue, since they are also related to Albanians’ cultural 
characteristics and history (Kokkali 2009; 2010). 
34These ones might either be truly atheists or just people who do not desire to reveal their religious beliefs and/or religious 
origin. Let us remind that Albanians have been subjected to twenty years of forced atheism, during the harsh regime of 
Enver Hoxha. In 1967, there was an official abolition of all religious activities, which, since then, became subjected to 
severe persecution
. 
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compared to the living standards in Greece, but also compared to the quality of the residences, which are mostly old and dilapidated, located on 
ground floors or basements. Many landlords refused to rent a house to the interviewees in question because 
they were Albanians. This was so for almost one person out of two, while for almost one person out of 
five renting a house was a problem because of a foreign origin in general (not specifically Albanian). 
In other words, almost 6 out of 10 persons interviewed had difficulties in purchasing or renting a 
house because they were not Greeks (Kokkali 2011b; 2008: 239-40).  
 As regards intermarriage with Greeks, percentages are very low. In 2007, for instance, in a 
total of 61,377 marriages all over Greece, 53,943 marriages either religious or civic were held among 
Greek nationals that is 88%. Intermarriage between Albanians and Greeks in particular, in the same 
year, counted for 1,16% of all marriages what is then a low percentage compared to the volume of the 
Albanian population living actually in Greece which is estimated at 5% of the total resident 
population. 
Georgians and Ukrainians 
 
According to the 2001 national census, there were approximately 30,000 Georgian and more than 
13,500 Ukrainian citizens living in Greece. Georgians were mainly concentrated in the region of 
Macedonia (70%) and smaller parts of this population lived in the Athens metropolitan area (14%) and 
Crete (6%). The largest share of Ukrainians (about 60%) live in Athens and others are scattered across 
the country. However, data from stay permits show that in 2007 about 40% of Georgians lived in 
Athens and another 40% in Thessaloniki. Maroufof and Nikolova (2010) argue that this change in 
their geographical distribution is related to both new arrivals and to an internal movement of 
Georgians from smaller cities to Athens where it is easier to find work.  
 Maroufof and Nikolova (2010) estimate that in 2008 Georgian citizens living in Greece (both 
under legal and irregular status) numbered 80,000 while Ukrainians were about 30,000. More 
interestingly, Ukrainian immigration to Greece is a typical case of female post-Communist migration. 
Women account for 3/4s of all Ukrainians living in Greece. However during the last few years new 
arrivals of Ukrainian women have slowed down and it is rather members of their families that join 
them in Greece. By contrast among Georgians women account for slightly more than half of all 
migrants. Both groups are in their vast majority (81% of Georgians and 92% of Ukrainians) in an 
economically productive age (between 15 and 65 years of age) and more than half were between 20 
and 45 years. 
Both Ukrainians and Georgians migrated for economic reasons to Greece. However, Greece is 
a secondary destination for Ukrainians who can be actually found scattered all over Europe, both in 
southern countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal and in northern and western ones (Germany, 
Poland, the UK, Ireland). Greece thus was part of the global migration patterns of Ukrainians almost 
by accident. Once Ukrainian migration started, the networks continued feeding it albeit without 
massive increases. By contrast Greece is a primary destination for Georgians (after Russia and the 
USA) not least because of the large number of Pontic Greeks that lived in Georgia before 1989 
(Maroufof and Nikolova 2010). 
 Georgians are for the most part Christian Orthodox while Ukrainians are Catholic, Orthodox 
or Uniates. Many among them have revived Greek Orthodox churches by attending Sunday mass. 
However, relations between Greece and Georgia or Ukraine were quite limited before 1989 and both 
Georgians and Ukrainians were faced with a foreign environment upon arrival in Greece. Their 
difference is linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and less markedly religious.  
Ukrainians in particular are also white, with fair complexion and tall, a phenotype that is 
appreciated in Greece as a sign of beauty. Indeed, Ukrainian women are considered as among the most 
beautiful women in Greece. But this goes beyond a simple positive or neutral stereotype, since it has 
been closely associated, first, to prostitution and paid services of the sex-industry
35
, and lately to 
marriages of young Ukrainian women to middle-aged Greek men. In 2002, the mayor of Zaxaro 
                                                     
35 This was also the case of Russians: the ‘Russian-woman-prostitute’ stereotype.  
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(village in Peloponnesus), in his electoral campaign, has promised to the unmarried middle-aged male 
residents of the village to find them brides from Russia, as a solution to the deficit of women in the 
whole region. The event has inspired the film director Kimon Tsakiris to do his very successful film 
“Sugartown”. Overall, the stereotyping on Ukrainians (and especially women, who are the main 
representatives of the Ukrainian migratory group) seems to have moved from the ‘Ukrainian/Russian 
prostitute’ to the ‘Ukrainian/Russian (potential) bride’, who comes to Greece to get married, as a 
means of survival.  
Southeast Asians (Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Afghani) 
 
The influx of Pakistani immigrants in particular began during the 1970s but their population 
augmented significantly during the period between 1991 and 2003. According to the 2001 census the 
Pakistani community of Greece numbered more than 11,000, 92% of which came to Greece in search 
of employment. According to the same census, 96% of the Pakistanis in Greece were men who work 
mostly in manufacturing industries but also in the fields of construction and services.  Based on data 
of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) there were at least 23,000 Pakistanis residing in Greece on 31 
December 2009.  
Bangladeshis are a more recent community since they began migrating to Greece after 1991. 
Based on the data of the last census of the National Statistical Service, 94% of about 5,000 migrants 
from Bangladesh who resided in Greece in 2001 came with the purpose of working and were mostly 
employed in small shops and restaurants while 97% of them were men. Data from the Labour Force 
Survey however suggest that there were 13,000 Bangladeshis living in Greece at the end of 2009. 
Lazarescu and Broersma (2010) estimate that there are between 30,000 and 60,000 Pakistanis and 
approximately 20,000 Bangladeshis living in Greece today. 
 Both groups are characterized by a stark gender imbalance: in their overwhelming majority 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants are men. Indeed qualitative research (Lazarescu and Broersma 
op.cit.) suggests that most of them are married but only 20% live in Greece with their families. They 
are generally unable to ask for family reunification because their income is too low and probably too 
unstable.  
 Afghanis in Greece are very recent arrivals. They are not included in high ranks in the labour 
force survey or in the database of the Ministry of the Interior, we know however that they have been 
among the top three nationalities among those apprehended at the Greek Turkish borders in the period 
2008-2010. Actually only in 2010 there were more than 20,000 arrests of people with Afghani 
citizenship at the Greek Turkish border. We therefore assume that there may be as many as 40,000 
Afghanis in Greece at this time. Further research is of course needed to confirm this number. 
 Diversity challenges raised by immigrant groups: All immigrant groups raise important 
identity challenges to the Greek majority to the extent that they are ethnically alien to the Greek 
nation. However, these challenges have been most acutely felt in relation to Albanian citizens for a 
number of reasons: because Albanians are by far the most numerous immigrant community in Greece, 
they are visible in the labour market, in schools, in leisure, among youth, in culture and the arts. 
Albanians also challenge Greek identity and culture because they are very close to it: the two groups 
share a common history (of conflict and coexistence), common culture and traditions (of the wider 
Balkans). Albanian immigration touches the most sensitive points of Greek national identity as it 
challenges the authenticity of the Greek nation and its symbolic boundaries with its neighbouring 
nations. Thus, it forces the Greek Christian Orthodox majority to re-consider both its internal and 
external boundaries: it obliges public opinion and a variety of social institutions such as the school, the 
welfare state, the labour market, state authorities defending equality in the labour market and in 
society to re-consider what it means to be Greek today (when 10% of the population is of immigrant 
origin, a vast majority of whom Albanian) and what are the rights of immigrants in Greek society and 
polity. It is interesting to note that the religious diversity of Albanians (when it was the case) has been 
largely invisible or indeed blurred not least because they have opted for an assimilatory path in this 
(but also in other) respect(s). By their silenced otherness they did not challenge the values and the 
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practices of the dominant society. They are thus actually considered – and in this respect they are 
indeed – the most integrated migratory group in Greece (Kokkali, 2011b).  
The debate that has arisen in December 2009 and January through March 2010 with regard to 
the citizenship law reform is an interesting point in question which highlights the predominantly ethnic 
diversity challenges that immigration raises for Greece. 
 Other groups of immigrants from Eastern Europe (Ukrainians, Georgians) have not posed 
important ethnic or religious challenges to Greek society because they largely share with the Greek 
majority the Christian Orthodox faith.  
 The immigrant groups that have most recently raised important diversity challenges in Greece 
by their visibility in the urban space are Asians. While Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Afghani 
immigration has been largely male only (and hence has not yet posed issues in school life for instance) 
and is overall numerically rather small, their largely illegal entry to Greece (crossing the Greek 
Turkish borders with the help of migrant smuggling networks), their concentration in downtown 
Athens, in crammed apartments where each room is inhabited by an entire family, and most 
importantly their instrumentalisation during the past few years (2007 onwards) by the Greek 
authorities has converted them (in the media and policy discourses) to the epitomy of the ‘migration 
evils’ that Greece suffers. Interestingly the question of irregular Asian migration through Turkey was 
related even to the discussion of the citizenship law reform in Parliament in March 2010 (see Gropas, 
Kouki and Triandafyllidou 2010). Indeed while the new naturalisation provisions did not concern of 
course irregularly staying and recently arrived aliens, several MPs used the argument of controlling 
and combating irregular migration to argue in favour or against the relaxation of naturalisation 
provisions. Indeed, in the parliamentary debate Greece was presented to be in danger because it is the 
‘door to Europe’ for millions of destitute and war-ravaged Muslims. Thus, while there has so far been 
only one major public issue (the construction of an official mosque in Athens, see Gropas and 
Triandafyllidou 2009) Asian Muslims have now started raising important religious and ethnic diversity 
challenges for Greek society.  
4. Definitions of tolerance in Greece  
 
The minority issues for long have been treated in Greece as taboos; they have thus stayed outside the 
public sphere and the public debate, what then permitted the emergence of non-transparent, arbitrary 
and oppressive regulations. Even if some NGOs and politicians (mainly of the left) support minority 
rights, the public discourse is dominated by fearful attitudes on “national dangers” that correlate any 
claim of a particular linguistic and/or religious identity to foreign interests and irredentist aspirations 
(Heraklides 1997; 2004).  
According to Skoulariki (2009: 69-70) after 1990, the political discourse on the minorities in 
Greece has been characterised by: 
- A formalistic invocation of the principle of fairness and egalitarianism. 
- An obsession with national homogeneity and the fear for otherness. 
- Suspicion towards minorities, which a priori are thought to be the “Trojan Horse” of foreign 
interests and a threat for the country’s territorial sovereignty.  
- A legalistic approach: only minorities recognised by international treaties, such as the Muslim 
religious minority of Thrace, are officially recognised by the state. 
- A selective reference to the ethnic dimension. For example, while the Slavic origins of the 
Pomak language are emphasised with a view to distinguishing the Pomaks (who are Muslims) 
from the ethnically Turkish majority of the Muslim minority in Thrace, the Slavic language 
and cultural identity of the Slavic-speaking Macedonians of Greece is not recognised by the 
Greek state.  
 
Despite the above situation regarding minorities, the linguistic and religious difference comes 
unavoidably into light, imposed by the undeniable socio-demographic changes that migration has 
brought to Greece. Indeed, given that in some schools of the Athenian city-centre, such as Petralona 
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and Gazi, the foreign pupils in a class reach 50%
36
, there is not any doubt that issues of otherness are 
here to stay.  
As a result, in recent years, there is an increasing debate going on – especially among teachers, 
education practitioners, associations dealing with educational issues (e.g. OLME/ Federation of 
Officers of Secondary Education) – on interculturalism, multiculturality and cultural difference. 
Interestingly this debate and the related education policies put in place by the Greek state do not 
associate in any way the education and other integration measures targeting immigrants with those 
targeting the Turkish Muslims of Thrace or the Roma population. Native and immigrant minorities are 
kept distinct in education policies and in all policy discourses. 
Besides, despite the ongoing discourse on the necessity for an intercultural education aligned 
with the new realities of the de facto multicultural Greek society, the understanding of Greekness (and, 
thus, of the Greek national identity) as mono-cultural and mono-ethnic seem to impede the ‘opening’ 
of the Greek educational system to the cultures of its foreign pupils. Indeed, as Gropas and 
Triandafyllidou (2011) point out, a frequent understanding of what intercultural education is, 
especially among educational practitioners, implies the foreigners’ assimilation to the Greek culture 
without involving any redefinition of this latter. Therefore, the so-called intercultural education 
policies are plural in the letter of the law but rather assimilatory in their daily practice, thus reflecting 
more strongly the dominant understandings of what is Greek national identity than the more general 
principles of respect for and recognition of cultural diversity in spite of the fact that those later are 
currently referred to as integral parts of a liberal democracy such as Greece. 
More generally, while multiculturality in Greece is gradually being accepted as a fact, 
multiculturalism is seen as a normative approach that predicates the parallel (but not integrated) co-
existence of different ethnic and cultural communities. By contrast, Greek policy makers and scholars 
tend to favour intercultural dialogue: notably the integration of individuals (not communities) into 
Greek society. In the Greek debate, the intercultural approach is seen as favourable to societal 
cohesion and as a normative and policy approach that is in line with modernity and liberalism
37
. In 
practice, however, there is little change in education, anti-discrimination or political participation 
policies towards this direction (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009).  
The debate on the 2010 law on citizenship and the immigrants’ brand-new right to vote in the 
local elections is telling of this discordance, which is again related to the understanding of Greekness. 
While an attempt to differentiate national identity from citizenship sees gradually the light in the 
public discourse the reference to Greek ideals and turbulent history (1821 war of independence, Asia 
Minor refugees, etc.) is dominant
38
. Indeed, as Kouki, Gropas and Triandafyllidou (2010) show in 
                                                     
36 “In the battle for grades without equal opportunities”, Ta Nea, 18 March 2010. 
37 See for instance the speeches on the national celebration of 28th October of both  the Prime Minister Kostas Simitis [27-
10-2003],(http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpegrb/2003/03-10-27.mpegrb.html#02) and the president of the main 
opposition party at the time, K. Karamanlis, 
(http://www.nd.gr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26372&Itemid=242).. The former declares: “and, on 
the occasion of the national celebration of 28th October, I urge all Greeks to fight together for […] Greece's progress and 
prosperity. […] For a Greece that respects human rights and diversity – a Greece that leads the chorus of modern 
democratic countries”; while the latter stress that “there aren’t any citizens of 2nd class in Greece of the 21st century” 
(referring to Roma populations). “Our goal must be to integrate the immigrant element – a progressive and creative 
integration into Greek society. With mutual respect and understanding. With acceptance of the religious beliefs, the 
cultural heritage, the culture in general… And, of course, on the condition that they must respect the place that hosts 
them, the place where they live, will study and will make family and children….”.  
38 Similar to the parliamentary debate, is the discourse in the press. We read, in the conservative quality broadsheet 
Kathimerini: “The issue of the ‘corruption’ of the national identity came several times into debate […]. It has been even 
attempted to negatively correlate this to the granting of citizenship to some social groups that live permanently in Greece. 
The granting of political rights (citizenship) does not necessarily require a certification of ‘Greekness’. Modern Greek 
society has shown through its long-term coexistence with other groups (Roma, Muslims of Thrace) that the dominant 
components of the Greek national identity such as language, religion and traditions, do not constitute the necessary and 
sufficient condition for political and inclusion of 'others'”, “Citizenship and national identiy”, H Kathimerini, 31 January 
2010. It is interesting how the ‘modern Greek society’ referred to in this quotation is perceived as separate of (though 
coexisting with) ‘other groups’ such as the Greek Roma and the Muslims of the recognised minority in Thrace, as if those 
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their analysis of a recent parliamentary debate on the new law, while there is a clear right-left wing rift 
as regards the dominant views on modern Greek identity, both views are based on the same elements 
of reference: national history and tradition and the national heroes. In this respect, the role of 
education is again put into debate. For those in favour of a civic citizenship, education is the means for 
becoming Greek, whereas, for those in favour of an ethnically based Greek nation, education should 
reinforce the existing ethno-religious conception of the nation but cannot convert to Greeks those who 
were born ‘foreigners’, that is to say of foreign parents.  
In the above discourses, but more generally in Greece overall, the cultural difference is 
understood as ethnic, linguistic and religious, all three echoing the ethnic conception of the nation. The 
ethno-linguistic difference refers to the genealogical aspect of the nation related to the common 
language and ancestry, whereas the religious part refers to Orthodoxy, which is also considered as 
intrinsic to Greekness.   
The media and parliamentary debates regarding the construction of a mosque in Athens, on the 
occasion of the 2004 Olympic Games, are indicative of the dominant understandings of difference in 
Greece and of how religious difference, in particular, should be accommodated. In their analysis of the 
debates in the press, Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2009) point out that, while it is generally considered 
that constructing a Mosque is not only a reasonable religious freedom but also a necessary venue for 
the needs of the Muslims who desire to practice their faith, a significant underlying unease still exists. 
This latter partly concerns geopolitics and identity, thus linking the religious aspects of Islam (the 
construction of a mosque) with the question of national security and the relationship between Turkey 
and Greece. As such, the question of the mosque becomes intertwined with Greece’s most significant 
Other (Turkey) and the West’s most significant threat (violent Islamic fundamentalism) rather than 
being treated as part of internal arrangements within Greek society. In other words, cultural and 
religious differences are defined as coming from outside and/or necessarily related to a sense of threat 
– both military and symbolic – to the nation and its well-being (op. cit., 966-968). The analogies with 
the discourses held on the internal minorities of Greece as “Trojan horses” of foreign factors are more 
than evident.  
In the above debate, another central issue was the disassociation of religious and national 
identity. Here again, exactly as in the discourses on the intercultural education, “modernity” was at 
stake, meaning that the establishment of a temple of worship for another faith was considered 
necessary in a ‘European’ and democratic country like 21st century Greece. The terms ‘tolerance’ and 
‘democracy’ were thus repeatedly mentioned. However, as Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2009: 969) 
maintain, diversity (and the tolerance of it) were recognised only as an individual private matter and 
not as an issue associated with the recognition of collective rights.  
Similarly, in her analysis of the press discourses and the political juxtaposition that followed 
the announcement of the candidature of Gulbeyaz Karahasan (a young Muslim woman from the 
Minority in Thrace) in the 2007 regional elections by the leader of the socialist party (PASOK), 
George Papandreou, Skoulariki (2009: 69-93) stresses the tenacity with which the Greek state 
considers the auto-definition as a strictly personal issue, refusing thus – even with judicial decisions of 
first degree – the auto-definition of citizens organised in associations, syndicates, etc. 
In the public discourse, the limits of tolerance (that is to say what and who is tolerated or 
considered as intolerable), apart from the above mentioned issue on the ‘individual vs collective’ 
recognition of diversity, are also set from what is said to be the democratic values of a modern state, 
21
st
 century Greece that is. In this respect, the main argument has been that, in the name of tolerance, 
we cannot abort basic civil rights as for instance equality in front of the law. The case of the Muslim 
minority of Thrace, where the Islamic law of the shari’a is valid instead, was abundantly cited39. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
latter do not constitute integral parts of the former. In the same issue of Kathimerini (devoted to migration), 57% of 
Greeks believe that migration alters the national identity of Greeks, while 45% are for and 45% against the right to 
participate to the elections and acquire the Greek citizenship (“Divisions on a vote of immigrants”, H Kathimerini, 31 
January 2010). 
39 See: “Holy apartheid for the women of the minority”, Eleytherotypia, Ios, 24 December 2006 (and in  
http://www.iospress.gr/ios2006/ios20061224.htm); “Jurists for the abolition of the Sharia in Thrace”, 06 March 2010 in  
http://tvxs.gr/news.  
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Another issue raised even if hesitantly, probably inspired from the western-European and north-
American discourses on terrorism, is the Islamic veil of women. A number of articles have recently 
dealt with whether the veil is a symbol of fundamentalism or of culture, as well as if it is compatible 
with the multiculturalism experienced in Greek schools
40
. Despite its democratic, liberal and modern 
coverage, this discourse is undoubtedly intertwined with the same unease that has characterized the 
debates on the construction of a Mosque in Athens. The apparent affirmation of the religious diversity 
– and in particular the Muslim otherness – appears indeed to bother the public opinion.  
In the above debates, the term tolerance is either not used at all or very scarcely. In the Greek 
context, tolerance (ανοχή /anohi) corresponds to liberal tolerance, notably the will to tolerate 
practices, beliefs or behaviours with which one does not agree although one has the power to suppress 
them. The use of the Greek term for tolerance is so far not connected to any sense of egalitarian 
tolerance, notably to acceptance, let alone respect of cultural diversity.  
Terms such as pluralism (πλουραλισμός) or liberalism (φιλελευθερισμός) are not used in the 
Greek political debate on migrants and minorities. There are no arguments made in the name of 
pluralism (let alone religious pluralism) nor in the name of liberalism. Liberalism is understood in the 
sense of right-wing neoliberal ideology not as regards diversity. The terms national heritage, national 
identity and the nation are often used and hotly debated as we have noted above and indeed in relation 
to issues pertaining to migrant diversity accommodation, integration or assimilation. 
Indeed, it is the term integration (ένταξη) that is mostly used in Greek political and policy 
debates on ethnic minority and immigrant diversity. Conveniently, its meaning is often not clarified 
and hence can range from  
- integration in a multicultural perspective (of both individual and group diversity, 
reconsideration of the meaning of national identity, pluralisation of national identity – but 
these views are held by a very small minority of left wing parties and intellectuals), to 
- integration in an intercultural perspective (integrating individuals as bearers of specific 
cultures, view of culture as a box, promotion of dialogue between cultures, acceptance and 
respect of ‘other’ cultures, but no reconsideration of the Greek national culture and identity, 
nor of the fact that for instance migrant or minority children are of ‘hybrid’ cultural 
upbringing),  and/or to 
- assimilation understood as the peaceful and welcoming but still total cultural, ethnic and 
linguistic assimilation of immigrants and minorities into the dominant Greek national culture 
and language. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Massive immigration flows towards Greece and the consequent shift of the country from an 
emigration to an immigration pole bring into light and stir old, unsolved issues of the Greek national 
identity. Moreover, given that the majority of those new immigrants are either nationals of 
neighbouring states or countries related to Greece’s not-so-distant past, it becomes clear that the 
newcomers, with their presence and their potential claims for respecting their cultural diversity, 
disturb old equilibriums and established orders. They challenge the idea of national security and 
territorial sovereignty, as well as the up-to-now crystallized idea of Greekness. Therefore, important 
parts of the Greek society tend to interpret any minority/immigrant claim of rights as a territorial claim 
of a neighbouring state that seeks to interfere in the domestic affairs.  
                                                     
40 “How much backtracking is the State willing to do in the sake of respecting diversity?” […] “the burqa is consistent with 
the democratic achievement of gender equality” (“The crisis has exacerbated tensions in Europe”, H Kathimerini, 31 
January 2010). “Do we prefer protecting the culture of […] the mullahs or engaging with the hundreds of Muslim women 
who are struggling to overcome the reactionary traditions of Islam and gain their freedom? Do we support the mixing of 
races or their separation and ghettoization?” (“The culture of Sabine”, Ta Nea, 8 August 2005. See also “Who is afraid of 
Islam?”, To Vima, 28 May 2006; “Hijab: a symbol or a terror?”, Ta Nea, 14 May 2009; “Conference on the Muslim 
woman in Europe”, 8 November 2008 in http://www.ert3.gr/news/et3newsbody.asp?ID=428206  
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Greece’s main immigrant groups are not complete “strangers” to Greece: Albanians and 
“Vorioepiroti” are added to the albanophone Arvanites, by now completely assimilated by the Greek 
element, but who have - for long - been a distinct community (18
th
-19
th
 centuries
41
); their descendants 
can still be found in Greece and are – in many cases – conscious of their (or at least of their fathers’ 
and grandfathers’) ethno-linguistic difference. Bulgarians are linguistically very close to a part of the 
recognised Muslim minority of Greece, the Pomaks, but also to the unrecognized minority of the 
Slavic-speaking population of the Greek region of Macedonia. Besides, the geographic proximity of 
this minority to the state of (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia (in which the dominant 
spoken language is quasi identical to the one spoken by the Slavic-speaking Greeks) stirs up identity 
and territorial fears of various kinds. 
Those fears substantiate the existing (traditional) suspicion towards minorities, but also 
nourish the unease of the Greek society regarding cultural diversity, and in particular religious – and 
most specifically Muslim – diversity. Despite the recent apparent changes in the general social climate 
(the media and parliamentary debates on diversity, the recognition of the need to implement changes 
in the educational system, the 2010 law on citizenship and the migrants’ participation to the local 
elections) and the undeniable fact that in the early 21
st
 century a more flexible understanding of Greek 
national identity emerges (especially among elites), there seems to be little room for the 
accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity in practice.  
The current acute economic crisis certainly does not make things any easier. Immigrants 
become easy scapegoats as impoverished Greeks start competing with them for jobs in the low skill 
sector and any claims for special measures (for Roma or immigrant children in schooling for instance) 
is seen through the lens of the budgetary constraints even more than before. The obvious arguments 
include: we have hardly enough money to provide for decent schooling for our own children. Can we 
really afford the extra effort for migrant children? We can hardly save our jobs and make ends meet, 
how can we bother about the special problems that migrants and their families face? And if Afghanis 
suffer persecution in their own country, does this mean that they have to come here to be fed? We 
cannot stand any more foreigners. The country has reached its limits.  
In this negative climate the notion of tolerance can provide for a fruitful normative and policy 
basis because it allows for different groups and claims to be treated differently. Liberal tolerance can 
be defended for a variety of diversity claims that do not necessarily require a whole-hearted 
embracement by the majority population but just their tacit approval for letting be. Such issues include 
the codes of dress, the customs and life choices including issues of gender equality of minority and 
immigrant people, to the extent that these habits do not infringe Greek civil law. In addition there can 
be a claim for egalitarian tolerance, that is for acceptance and recognition of specific claims to cultural 
and religious diversity that require public recognition and state support to be satisfied. Such claims 
include the construction of one or more official Muslim temples in Athens; the introduction of 
alternative religion classes in schools; and the recognition of the native and immigrant populations’ 
contribution to the Greek history and to society and economy today. Last but not least, the principle of 
non-tolerance can also provide for a good basis for forbidding practices that are against the Greek 
Constitution and Greek civil law (for instance some provisions of shari-a family law that treat 
daughters and wives as unequal to their male counterparts, marriages at the age of puberty, and female 
circumcision). Ultimately the issues that will be subject to non-tolerance, liberal tolerance and 
egalitarian tolerance will have to be decided on a case by case basis and in relation to their specific 
context. It is worth noting that deciding what is tolerable and intolerable is also a way of drawing 
boundaries between ‘us’, the ingroup, and ‘them’ , the outgroup(s).  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
41 Circa 1850, there was still a sizable albanophone population in Greece, located mainly in Attica, north of Euboea, etc. 
According to the 1928 census, the ethnic Albanian population reached 19,000 people, but it seems that this figure is 
underestimated and that we should instead consider a figure around 65,000 people (Poulton, 1991) 
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